LIBYA IN SUSPENCE – WILL IT SURVIVE?

Libya ranks 173 out of 180 in the Corrupt Perception Index (CPI) for 2020. You can look up the CPI easily on your smart phone or similar. You can also read about the CPI’s reliability in the same way. If, like me, you need further confirmation that corruption is rife in Libya, read on. You will find confirmation enough in the words of the sometime acting head of UNSMIL, Ms Stephany Williams, which I have included in this piece. Does it matter? It does because it will endanger any and every potential political process in Libya and it will make, and is making, the lives of ordinary Libyan’s exceedingly difficult and Libya is a country with enormous oil reserves. 

In Libya’s old province of Cyrenaica sits Field Marshall Khalifa Hafter at the head of the Libyan National Army which he raised from scratch and which he holds together personally.  He is still referred to as a renegade war lord by those who would see him fall from power. He certainly has enemies enough. He is, however, the de Facto ruler of east and much of south Libya. He has chosen Turkey as his enemy because that countries’ President Erdogan has planted a significant military footprint in Libya’s western Provence, Tripolitania.

 Khalifa Haftar fought long and bloody battles to remove the Islamist jihadists from Benghazi and Derna. He was successful in the end and he was tempted to go for Tripoli. He gave clear notice of his intentions and there was a time when Fayez al Serraj, the head of the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, might have attempted to negotiate with him. Al Serraj had closed the door on talks with Haftar emphatically and publicly. He could not eat his words it seems. To blame Haftar solely for intransigent behaviour is too easy.

But Haftar’s surprise attack on Libya’s capital was, in my view at least, his great misjudgement. When his army arrived at the gates of Tripoli, he clearly expected discontented Tripoli militias to go over to his side. They did not and so Haftar was forced to attack the city without them and attempt to grind his way into its vitals. There may have been a time when he could have sued for an advantageous peace. Perhaps he thought he could win. He overlooked the belligerent determination of Turkey’s President Erdogan who saw Haftar was overextended, went for his throat and pushed him out of Tripolitania.

It is pertinent to ask how many died in the battles for Tripoli because the answer will have a bearing on Libya’s future. We can bet there were many. Some sources say that 1,048 were killed and 5,558 wounded in four months between April July 2020.  Some say that over 2,356 were killed altogether. It will be more than that.

There appeared recently a force of nature in Libya in the person of Stephanie Williams, an American diplomat in the service of the United Nations, not unused to controversy and well versed in the Arab world. Libyan women have been struggling to emerge into public life since the heady days in Benghazi in the early Arab spring but have so far been muted by the violence and aggression which has characterised the exercise of power in Libya for too long. Ms Williams seemed determined that the ballot box should outclass the Kalashnikov in Libyan politics. The vigour with which she set about the job of making the process probable was applauded and appreciated by the overwhelmingly male players in Libya’s political and military life.

She convened a series of meetings between respected figures in Libyan public life chosen from each of the Fezzan, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and called the body so formed the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) ‘to generate consensus on a unified governance framework and arrangements that will lead to the holding of an election in the shortest possible time frame in order to restore the sovereignty and the democratic legitimacy of Libyan institutions.’ She persuaded the LPDF to set 24th December 2021 as the date for a general election in Libya. It was on 24th December 1951 that Libya achieved independence.

She is an articulate and forthright diplomat. Here she is being very forthright indeed. She makes the problems Libya faced in December 2020 crystal clear.

‘The opening remarks to the 75 members attending the virtual meeting of the second round of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF).by the Acting UNSMIL head Stephanie Williams on 23rd November 2020.

‘’I want to remind you as I said before, time is not on your side. I would like to alert you to the fact that there is a direct cost for inaction and obstruction.

Some indicators I want to alert you to:

1. There are now 10 military bases in your country- all over your country – and not in a particular area – that are today either fully or partially occupied by foreign forces.
2. There are now 20,000 foreign forces and/or mercenaries in your country. That is a shocking violation of Libyan sovereignty. You may believe that these foreigners are here as your guests, but they are now occupying your house. This is a blatant violation of the arms embargo.
3. They are here pouring weapons into your country, a country which does not need more weapons.
4. They are not in Libya for your interests, they are in Libya for their interests.
5. “Dirou balkom” [take care]. You have now a serious crisis with regard to the foreign presence on your country.
6. I have previously warned you about the declining socioeconomic conditions in the country and the fact that we expect in one months time, exactly in January 2021, there will be 1.3 million Libyans, your compatriots, your citizens in need of humanitarian assistance.
7. There is a sharp decline in the purchasing power of the Libyan Dinar. The liquidity crisis has fully returned. There is a shortage of cash in circulation.
8. There is a terrible electricity crisis now. I don’t need to remind you of how terrible the electricity shortages were last summer. Because of the terrible corruption and the mis-governance, all over the country. I am not pointing fingers. This is a crisis in the West and in the East. You have a crisis of corruption. You have a mis-governance crisis and now you have only 13 of 27 powerplants that are functioning.
9. One billion US dollars is needed immediately to be invested in the electrical infrastructure in order to avert a complete collapse of the electrical grid in your country.
10. This is very difficult now because of the divisions in the institutions, and because of the epidemic of corruption and this kleptocratic class that is determined to remain in power.
11. This is accompanied by a deepening COVID-19 crisis. You now have almost 94,000 COVID-19 cases in Libya. We think those estimates are low and that the actual number is higher, but there is a terrible shortage of testing in the country.
12. .
13. While there is a lot of political tourism going to different countries and capitals, the average Libyans are suffering, and the indications of improvement for their situation are not there.
14. We believe – and I think many of you believe – that the best way to move forward is through this political dialogue. This is a broad and inclusive forum for decision-making and people are counting on you. We went a long way (at our last meeting) in Tunis. We set the date of elections. We need to hold all those institutions that need to produce the elections accountable, but you also have a governance crisis. The best way to address your governance crisis is to unify your institutions, to unify your Central Bank which needs to have a board meeting to address the exchange rate crisis immediately.
15. I know that there are many who think that this whole dialogue is just about sharing power, but it is really about sharing responsibility for future generations. This is my ask of you as we have the discussions today in going forward, because, and I will say it again, time is not on your side”.

The deliberations of the LPDF, skilfully guided by Ms. Williams, concluded with the decision that a Government of National Unity (GNU) was raised which reflected a fair representation from each of the provinces, as far as that was possible. It then superseded the Government of National Accord, a body that had signally failed to govern. The GNU was tasked with selecting a committee charged with writing a new constitution before the ballot takes place.

The GNU obtained the formal approval of a quorate House of Representatives, Libya’s remaining elected legislative authority but which has been divided for too long. It was to undertake, as its first priority, the preparations for and the administration of the ballot on 24th December 2021 and, in order to forestall accusations of regional bias to make Sirte its seat of power. 

All candidates for the new GNU undertook to hold national presidential and parliamentary elections on 24th December 2021 in which they will not stand for office, and to appoint women to 30 percent of senior government roles.

But they decided that there can be no elections without a settled constitution and that may yet prove a sticking point. Firstly, is it to be a secular constitution? Or will it be hijacked my militant Islamists and become bogged down in arguments about the place Sharia Law is to play in the constitution?

A further difficulty may be obtaining approval from Libya’s ethnic minorities. The Amazigh (Berbers and Tuaregs) and Tebu ethnic minorities have so far refused to approve a draft constitution hammered together some time ago. There will be plenty of opportunities to cause delays.

What is Haftar’s potential role in the proposed democratic process? He still has effective power in the east of Libya and considerable influence in southern Libya. In stark terms, and at the time of writing, the political process is unlikely to proceed in the east without Haftar’s cooperation – or his death or deposition – for the simple reason that no election can be held in the east unless he facilitates it. Why? Because he has consolidated his hold over key units in the LNA and brought his army to the aid of the civil power.

So, what has Haftar been doing? He has been building his LNA into an effective fighting force and is preparing it for a ‘fight to the death’ with Turkey which has become the significant military power in Tripolitania.

We can discern a careful plan behind all his actions. He has cranked up his propaganda machine and displayed his disciplined Libyan National Army in impressive parades and ceremonials. He has promoted his loyal officers, made a public display of doing so and receiving their gratitude with carefully controlled dignity and ceremony. He has held exercises in the hinterlands with live firing and realistic objectives. In so doing he has demonstrated his power, military hardware and the effectiveness of his army in field exercises both to potential enemies and wavering allies. He has cultivated the leaders of the respected tribes and rewarded the Awaquir in Benghazi in particular.

Most significant of all he has brought his army to the aid of the civil powers in Benghazi in particular and as far south as Kufra. In this he has made himself the effective civil power in east Libya. He has, like many leaders in history, chosen an enemy – Turkey in his case – which he can use to rouse his wavering and his loyal allies.

Amongst the remaining issues which have involved Haftar in Libya’s future is the distribution of the oil wealth amongst the Libyan people, a matter which has been a cause of considerable discord. It has been associated with the possibility of corruption and misgovernance. Haftar has persuaded the eastern and southern tribes to support his efforts to clean up the mess. Even if he is toppled from the command of the LNA we must recognise his efforts to see that an equitable distribution of Libya’s oil wealth is established.

Which returns us to the matter of corruption. It must be amongst the most pressing problems faced by those who would settle Libya’s issues. Here is the courageous Stephanie Williams addressing the matter head on when she said this to the British newspaper, the Guardian: “[In Libya] Their numbers numerically are not significant, but there is a constituency of the status quo. The existing political class are not interested in committing class suicide. They see any change through a temporary executive or to national elections as an end to their privileged access to the coffers, and resources of the state, and so it would put an end to their system of patronage that they have so adeptly developed in the past few years.”

“Elections are a direct threat to their status quo, and they are going to fight to defend their status quo, and it’s my belief that those are trying to block the formation of a consensual unified executive are the very same political forces that will try to block elections.”

King Idris struggled with corruption. Ghaddafi joined the gang. Any future government of Libya attempting to eliminate ingrained and all-pervading corruption will be faced with a classic dilemma – fight it or join it. Allowing the rampant pillage of Libya’s resources by what Williams calls the kleptocracy has a sad but practical merit in that it maintains what stability that remains in the war-ravaged country. But fighting it upsets the equilibrium – which is already fragile. ,

A government bent on clearing up the tragic mess will need a very strong mandate indeed and the support of an independent and incorruptible civil service and judiciary. At the time of writing that seems unlikely.   

John Oakes

25th March 2021

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LIBYA – HAFTER HAS WEAPONISED THE TRIBES (FURTHER NOTES ON FIELD MARSHALL KHALIFA HAFTER’S STRATEGY DATED 19TH FEBURARY 2020)

It is for others to write about the Tripoli government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) as it is known. For these notes it is sufficient to say that it has resorted to an alliance with Turkey’s President who has commenced the supply of military hardware, advice and numerous Syrian mercenaries which have strengthened the GNA’s militias defending Tripoli and Misurata against Hafter’s Libyan National Army (LNA).  

Negotiations between representatives of the GNA and the LNA are taking place – or were taking place until today – in Geneva to arrange a lasting cease fire. Hafter’s LNA has effective control over most of Libya barring Tripoli and Misurata. He is able to use his high-tech weapons to attack targets in Tripoli and has fired on shipping in Tripoli’s harbour and on its only functioning airport.

The diplomatic efforts to devise a sustainable political solution to Libya’s long and brutal civil war are troubled by the divergences within the EU and the Gulf Sates involved in a proxy war in Libya. The weapons embargo placed long ago on Libya is being systematically violated.

Hafter, when confronted with Turkey’s belligerent intervention, was, in my view forced to play the tribal card. Libya is almost totally dependant on the revenue it earns from its extensive oil fields. These fields and the oil terminals though which the stuff is exported are in remote parts of Libya. Most Libyans live in the coastal cities such as Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata, Tobruk and Derna for example. It is notoriously difficult to get people to work in the remote oil installations. The quasi military force, the Petroleum Facilities Guard, which guards them draws its recruits largely from tribesmen in whose homeland the installations are situated. I have written at greater length about this here. In effect, Hafter has used the Petroleum Facilities Guard to shut down the majority of Libya’s oil industry at the instigation, it is said, of Libyan tribal leaders. Hafter has a strangle hold on the Government of National Accord in Tripoli. He has weaponised the Libyan tribes.

According to the Libya Herald: –

‘In its latest information bulletin on the oil blockade of ports and pipelines released yesterday, Libya’s state National Oil Corporation (NOC) confirmed a drop in production to the current level of 191,475 b/d, as of Wednesday February 12, 2020, with losses at US$ 1,380,468,480.’l

The threat of fuel and power shortages in Tripoli, Misurata and other major cities is acute.

As I write, sheiks and notables from Libya tribes are gathering in Tarhuna for a conference. It will be interesting to see which tribes attend and what resolutions emerge from their deliberations.

LIBYA – HAFTER PUSHES ELEMENTS OF HIS FORCES FROM SIRTE TO ABU GREIN SOME 120 KM SOUTH EAST OF MISURATA. (DATED 31ST JANUARY 2020 AND UPDATED 8TH FEBRUARY 2020)

Hafter has pushed forward his Libya National Army defensive line to the westwards of Sirte. It has stopped at the town of Abu Grein and may consolidate there to protect the strategic city of Sirte and to threaten Misurata, Libya’s third largest city.

I do not remember Abu Grein though some years ago I drove from Tripoli to Benghazi along the old coastal road. I assume it offers Hafter a defensible position from whence he can screen Sirte and the Libya Oil Crescent. This map may be useful despite being somewhat over busy. It gives the overall picture of the current war some days ago.

I have been arguing in this blog for some time that Hafter is a canny general. He has experience of urban warfare. His battles for the eastern cities of Benghazi and Derna will have given his fighters plenty of bitter experience of the collateral damage urban warfare causes both to people and military reputations. He will not forget that the Misurata militias are battle hardened and from a substantial part of his enemy’s military assets.

I suspect he will slowly tighten his cordon around the Tripoli oasis and redouble his efforts to influence the proxy war now afoot in Libya.

He will see Turkey’s belligerent intervention as a propaganda windfall as well as a military hazard. The French and the Greeks have been making very strong protests about Ankara’s efforts to send regular Turkish Army personnel and to sponsor the movement of Syrian militias into Misurata and Tripoli. The French nuclear aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle is on station in the Eastern Mediterranian as a sign of President Macron’s unease.

As far as I can ascertain these are the Syrian militias preparing to go to – or are already in – Misurata. (I would welcome some information about them and their capabilities from anyone with the expertise in the subject of Syrian militias. In the meantime this appears to be the man behind the source. You will make your own assesment of its reliability. ) They are believed to be the al-Mu’tasim Brigade, Sultan Murad. Brigade, Northern Falcons Brigade, Hamzat, Legion of Levant, Suleiman Shah, Samarkand Brigade and the Euphrates Shield. I may have missed some but there are said to be 1,700 militiamen preparing to move or have already been deployed to Libya.

There is a good piece on the mercenary groups operating in Libya here. This piece about the Russian Wagner group fighting with Hafter’s LNA is interesting.

I suggest that Ankara’s belligerence has played into Hafter’s hands. Libya was an Ottoman province of importance. Hafter’s propaganda machine will not hesitate to put much emphasis on what he will suggest is the Turkish president Erdogan’s effort to re-establish Turkish colonial power in Libya.

Both sides in the Libya proxy war and both sides on the ground in Libya are engaged in an intense diplomatic campaign and a fierce propaganda war. Hafter will aim to influence civilians in Misrata and Tripoli to support him or at least oppose his enemies. His intelligence and propaganda assets are likely be in contact with people within Tripoli and Misurata. This paper by Nathaniel Greenburg gives some detailed and interesting background about the role of propaganda in Libya.

I suggest that Hafter will be intensifying his efforts to influence and spread discord amongst his opponents and to gain favour amongst the citizens of Tripoli and Misurata.

LIBYAN OIL PORTS CLOSED BY TRIBES SUPPORTING HAFTER AND THE LNA. (19TH JANUARY 2020)

Today the international effort to bring peace to Libya is focussed on the conference in Berlin attended by Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Johnson,and President Macron as well as heads of sate, ministers and diplomats from Italy, Turkey, USA and Russia amongst others. Field Marshall Khalifa Hafter who commands the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Head of the Govenment of National Accord (GNA), are, of course, attending.

It is the primary purpose of the conference to establish an agreement between the GNA and Hafter. Other observers – with better insights and sources than I have – will be commenting on the conference and its outcome.

There are corroborated reports from Egytian and Libyan sources that the eastern oil ports have been closed by tribes in support of Hafter. They are said to oppose the arrival of Turkish sponsored mercenaries from Syria to strengthen the GNA which is defending Tripoli and Misurata against Hafter’s LNA which now surrounds them.

It is noted that Hafter’s LNA holds Eastern and Southern Libya and thus the important oil fields and the oil ports around the Gulf of Sirte and the oil port near the Eastern city of Tobruk.

Libya’s oil revenue is paid to the Libyan National Oil Company which is based in Tripoli and which has hitherto remained relatively neutral despite the schisms caused by the long years of armed strife in Libya. Hafter, it should be noted, has de facto control over most of Libya’s oil fields and the means of shipping their output but is unable to sell the oil. He has only once attempted to interfear with this. (There was an attempt to control the oil ports by an adventurer called Jhadran. Hafter effectivel removed Jhadran with the assistance of local tribes which exert some influence over the so callled ‘oil crescent’ of which more annon)

Turkey’s belligerent attempt to send troops – or Turkish sponsored militias – to the assistance of Hafter’s enemies has clearly had the effect of uniting powerful Libyan tribes against what they percieve as an attempt to revive Ottoman rule in Libya. It is noted that the tribes likely to be involved in the closure of the oil ports are the amongst those which cooperated with the Libyan resistance hero Omar Mukhtar in a long rebellion against the Italian occupation of Libya which followed the removal of the Turks in 1911. These tribes will be profoundly opposed to the percieved attempt by Turkey to renew ‘colonial’ ambitions.

These are the tribes in whose homeland the eastern oil ports are found. The al – Magharba tribe in which are the Ras Lanuf, the Marsa Brega and the al-Zuetina terminal and the al-Abaidat in which the Tobruk oil terminal is situated. The Zawia (known locallly as the Sway) tribe holds sway over the oil fields and much of the pipelines. (N.B. Spelling of Libyan tribal names vary – these are mine and follow E.E. Evans-Prtichard)

These tribes are amongst the so called Saadi tribes which are highly respected and influential. However, they would need encouragemet to act togther. The possibility that Hafter has been able to coordinate their actions – or at least encourage them to do so – is strong. It will not have escaped the notice of the more diligent diplomats that Hafter’s highly respected tribe, the Farjan, lives amongst the al-Magharba and the Awaqir tribes in the area stretching from near Sirte in the west to Bengahzi in the east. It makes a powerful statement of intent which those gatherd in Germany today might be wise to note.

It is significant that the Libyan National Oil Company has stated: –

“The blockade instructions were given by Maj Gen Nagi al-Maghrabi, the commander of Petroleum Facilities Group appointed by the Libyan National Army, and Col Ali al-Jilani from the LNA’s Greater Sirte Operations Room,”

Major General Nagi al-Maghrabi is a member of the Maghrabi tribe mentioned above. The Petroleum Facilites Group is a paramilitary force which guards the Libyan oil assets such as the oil ports around the Gulf of Sirte known as the ‘Oil Crescent’. They are in the homeland of the al-Magharba tribe and the guards are recruited locally. The oil ports can only have been taken over with their cooperation, or by the ‘tribesmen’ of the Patroleum Facilities Group.

At 15:45 UK time it was reported that tribes in Libya’s south west have occupied the Murzuk oil fields effectivley closing down the whole of Libya’s oil exports. The tribes are said to be acting against the percieved attempt by Turkey to interfear in Libya.

LIBYA – HAFTAR HAS TAKEN SIRTE AND IS THREATENING MISURATA. (A WORK IN PROGRESS UPDATED 17TH JANUARY 2020)

Turkey has become belligerent and is attempting to gain a foothold in Libya. The Turkish parliament recently voted to send troops to aid the Libya ‘Government of National Accord’ (GNA) whose militias are under attack on the outskirts of Tripoli by the Libyan National Army (LNA) commanded by Field Marshall Khalifa Hafter. Some Turkish units have already been positioned in Tripoli and have, so far, opened an operations room from which they are helping to the GNA’s attempts to defend itself from Haftar’s forces. Turkish drones are being used in the defence of Tripoli and are likely ‘flown’ by Turkish ‘pilots’.

Turkey has been roundly condemned for this aggressive move by Egypt, Algeria and the African Union. Algeria has stated that it will not stand by and allow Turkish interference in Libya and Tunisia has stated that it will not offer Turkey bases from which to launch attacks on Libya. The African Union, which has also condemned the Turks, is anxious about the effect of its interference in Libya on the Sahel states which are not stable. Turkey has already severely antagonised Greece and Cyprus. It is disputing the sovereignty of some of the Greek islands and its invasion of Cyprus in the 1970 has left part of that island under Turkish control.

There are strange but uncorroborated reports such as this. Syrian militias are being offered Turkish citizenship and big money to fight in Libya. This appeared in a Libyan source recently; Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Research Fellow at the US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute, stated that “sources inside the Turkish-backed Syrian factions tell me that in exchange for fighting in Libya, fighters are being promised Turkish citizenship after 6 months of deployment.” (Note dated 15th January 2020; An article dated 15th January 2020 in the British broadsheet, the Guardian, coroborates and expands on this report.)

The GNA was, until Monday 6^th January, in effective possession of Tripoli, Libya’s capital, its third largest city, Misurata,which lies 211 Km east of Tripoli and Sirte, Gaddafi’s birthplace on the Gulf of Sirte some 271 Km south east of Misurata. Much of the armaments, including drones, which Turkey has sent to aid the GNA have been shipped into Libya via Misurata’s port. The Misurata’s ‘Flying School’ has been used as a base for the GNA’s air force.

Haftar, from his headquarters in Benghazi, has reacted decisively to the Turkish threat. His forces hold sway over Eastern Libya, including the so-called oil crescent around the Gulf of Sirte and in Sothern Libya once known as the Fezzan. On Monday 6^th January units of his LNA marched into Sirte virtually unopposed. The GNA’s militias hitherto in possession of the city retreated towards Misurata.

I suggest that Hafter’s forces will now move on Misurata as rapidly as possible to at least threaten and at best take possession of the city and its port before the Turks are able to get enough boots on the ground. To this end Haftar’s forces have announced the expansion of the war zone near Misurata and declared a no-fly zone which extends over the Tripoli. The no-fly zone comes into effect at 21:00 local time on 9^th January. It includes Tripoli’s Mitiga airport and civil airlines are warned that their aircraft risk destruction if they attempt to ignore the no-fly zone.  

However, the Misurata militias are battle hardened and aggressive and I suspect Hafter may hope that the Turks will be discouraged by international condemnation from committing a large expeditionary force in Libya. Much will depend on the attitude adopted by the Misurata militias in the face of a potential large-scale Turkish intervention. Haftar has called for a ‘jihad’ against the Turks and there will be lingering resentment amongst many in Misurata about Turkey’s history in Libya.

Libya was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1551 to 1911 when Italians invaded and took possession. The main value of Libya to the Ottoman Turks was the slave trade via the slaving routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Tripoli and Benghazi. Also, Ottoman Tripoli was one of the principle ports of the notorious Barbary Corsairs. There was a period of ‘home rule’ in Libya under the Karamanli dynasty between 1711 and 1835. The Karamanlis were a family of Turkish cavalry officers who had married Libyan women and ceased power from the Ottoman Pasha of Tripoli in a brutal coup. It was during the Karamanli regime that Libya and the newly formed United States of America were briefly at war.

We do not have to look far for a principle reason for Turkey’s interest in establishing itself in Libya. The eastern Mediterranean is harbouring substantial natural gas reserves. They will be difficult to exploit for physical reasons. The most pressing difficulty is that to monetarise them a number of national interests have to be bought into agreement. Countries laying claim to a share of the reserves are Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Libya. Turkey has no claim having no continental shelf falling within the undersea gas fields. It is noted that Turkey took a part of eastern Cyprus by forces in the 1970’s but its claim over what is called Turkish Cyprus is recognised only by itself. Some background on this problem can be found here.

Turkey has recently signed a treaty with the GNA in Libya which allows it some leverage in Libya’s claim to part of the eastern Mediterranean gas reserves. This is antagonising the other claimants considerably. Should Turkey consolidate its hold over the Libyan GNA it will, because of Libya’s strategic position in the Mediterranean, gain a whip hand in the exploitation of the eastern Mediterranean gas reserves. It is as well to remember that Turkey is now heavily dependent on Russian natural gas delivered through the TurkStream pipeline laid below the Black Sea and opened for business a few days ago. It should also be noted that TurkStream will be extended to carry Russian natural gas to European countries in the near future.

Turkey’s motivation for sending troops to Libya and the consternation it causes is probably best understood in terms of access to energy supplies.

HAFTER WENT TO MOSCOW TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE TRIPOLI GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL ACCORD (UPDATE 14TH JANUARY 2020)

President Putin has perusaded Fied Marshall Khalifa Hafter to sign a cease fire in LIbya and agree to travel to Moscow and possibly sign a peace treaty with the Goverment of National Accoyd, his opponent in Tripoli. I have followed the progress of Hafter for some time and porpose to draw on the insights I have gained tio suggest why he has decided that the time is ripe to bring the fighting to an end and commence negotiations leading to a possible settlement in Libya.

Firstly, he would not have agreed to go to Moscow if he was not in a postions to negotiate from strength. His forces have recently taken the startegically important city of Sirte and he has been strong enough to declare a no-fly zone over Tripoli.

However, he may reason that he has reached a point where the risk inherent in futrher military action may be too great. That is, he may have calculated that taking Misurata and Tripoli would be costly militarly, politically and internationally.

He has been recruiting Sudanese militias from Drafur which may show that he is finding it difficult to recruit and train sufficient troops to keep his widly dispersed territory and its diverse population under his control and, at the same time, fight a costly and prologed urban battle which he would face had he continued his advance on Misurata and Tripoli. His battle to expel radical Islamist militias from Benghazi was prolonged and dirty. He may have calculated that the fanaticism and experience of some of the militias which oppose him would have caused long and politically costly delays.

In political terms he may calculate that the viscious and costly nature of urban warfare would arouse too much anti-war sentiments in the capital city and would alienate too many of the passive population against him.

He may recognise that there are traits in his personality and incedents in his history which do not make him potentially popular. His dual Libyan-US citizenship does not sit well with some factions in Libya. His notable ability to raise an army and to wield it well may not transfer into politcal sucsess.

Internationally he has been successful in gaining support from, amongst others Egypt, France, UAE and Russia and the tacit support of his sothern neighbours such as Chad and Niger. At one time Presidneyt Trump voiced his support but his somewhat bellicose remarks were modified by more balanced and statsmanlike communiques later. The USA is seruously concerend about the presence of IS and al Qaeda in Libya and suspect that they have enthusiastic allies in some of the militias supporting the Government of National Acciord in Tripoli.

Recently and in response to Turkey’s proposed military support for the Tripoli GNS Algeria made it clear that it would not tolerate foriegn intervention in Libya and the Afrcan Union was clearly opposed to Turkey’s beligerent threats. Italy, at one time a potential ally of Turkey against Hafter, is somewhat restrained by indecision right now.

I suggest that Turkey’s belligerence when it proclaimed its intention to send troops to aid Hafter’s enemies has caused consternation. It was clear that Egypt would not tolerate this and it demostrated its oppostion with naval ecercises in or near Libya territorial waters.

Persident Putin, ever the opportunist, was in comunication with the Turkish president Erdogen during the events around the opening of the TurkStream pipeline supplying Russian natural gas to Turkey. The influence he thus secured was sufficient to discourage Turkey’s beligerence and broker a cease fire between Tripoli and Hafter which appears to be holding resonably well so far.

The desperately dangerous sutuation in Iran will have concentrated minds in favour of avoiding all-out urban war in Tripoli and Misurata.

HAFTER REFUSES TO SIGN THE PEACE TREATY (FURTHER UPDATE 14TH JANUARY 2020)

Hafter has declined to sign the peace treaty proposed by presidents Putin and Erdogen and is believed to have left Moscow. It appears that the treaty did not allow for a satisfactory time table for disbanding the Tripoli militias. Hafter is of the opinion that they are dangerous.

He must be suffciently confident that he will be supported by Egypt and the UAE should Erdogen attempt to send troops to aid the Government of National Accord. Erodogen is now making belllicose threats about punishing Hafter.

WHY DID HAFTER REFUSE TO SIGN THE TREATY? (UPDATE 16TH JANUARY 2020)

There is some speculation about why Hafter risked refusing to sign the Putin/Erdogen treaty between him and the Tripoli Government of National Accord. A sometime British ambassador to Libya apparently suggests that Hafter is confident that his allies, Egypt, the UAE and others, will come to his aid should Erdogen commit Turkish or Turkish sponsored troops to join the Tripli militias.

Hafter has long held, and expressed, the view that the Tripoli militias are corrupt and contain too many militant Islamists. It has been one of his principle aims to defeat them and establish an independent police force and judiciary. He would not abandon that view or that plan easily. He can be somewhat volatile but he would not, in my view, abandon one of his principle objectives and Putin and Erdogen must have been ill advised to try to persuade him to do so.

There is another speculative hypothosis doing the rounds. It suggetst that he may have concluded also that Erdogen and Putin had privatley cooked up a plan to remove him from the field in their own interests. There is no eveidence to suport this.

Their is also the view in some quartes that should the Turks send a large body of troops to Libya public opinion would turn in Hafter’s favour. The history of Ottoman rule (see above) is not viewd with favour in modern Libya, a country which has not long, in the scheme of things, been independent.

Hafter can be volatile and he may have been angry enough by the lack of a commitment to stand down the Tripoli militias to put his long planned and carefully exicted plan in peril. I suggest he may believe he has sufficient strength and outside support to win the battle for Tripoli. If not, the outcome is likely to be a catastrophy for Libya.

HAFTER AGREES TO ATTEND A MEETING IN BERLIN ON SUNDAY 19TH JANUARY WITH MACRON, MERKLE AND HIGH STATUS REPRESENTATIVES FROM TURKEY, RUSSIA, US, UK, CHINA ANS ITALY. (UPDATED 17TH JANUARY 2020)

On 16th June Heiko Maas, the German foreign minister, arrived in Bengahzi to invite Hafter to a summit meeting in Berlin at which he will make his expectations clear about a possible peace treaty between him and the Tripoli Goverenmant of National Accord.

It is clear that he cannot refuse to attend but he will expect a better informed and more balanced reception of his case than was possible when he met Erdogen and Putin in Moscow. He may well have felt that Erdogen in particular and Putin attempted to railroad him into signing a peace treaty which had been toheavily biased in favoutr of the Tripoil GNA.

Erdogen was said to have displayed anger in no uncertain terms after the Moscow peace intiative failed and has since upset a number of governments by continuing to send Turkish or Turkish sponsered troops to Libya. The US State Department has just expessed its alarm by calling for the removal of all mercenaries from Libya.

In the meantime consultations are taking place with the Algerian government and, no doubt, with Egypt. Both countries have been critical of Turkey’s belligerent intervention in Libya.

TRIPOLI – MY LETTER TO A BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE MINISTER

As I write the democratic process in the UK is in some disorder. We ordinary British folk are watching our parliament, which prides itself on being the mother of parliaments, now unable to reach agreement about the UK’s relationship to the rest of Europe. We are also watching the component parts of the UK becoming restive and seeking independence.  Fortunately, the UK police force and judiciary remain relatively independent of political manipulation and retain the trust of most citizens – so far, that is.

I note with some scepticism that the British Foreign Office is attempting to obtain a vote in the UN which calls for a democratic solution to the current armed conflict in Libya. Eventually, of course, that must be the solution. Right now, however, I am surprised at the naivety this embodies. I am even more surprised as one of the current Foreign Office ministers kindly claimed that he was inspired by a speech I made many years ago to become an MP and to use his talents to lead for the human good. I would tell him this, clearly and emphatically. Firstly, deal with the Tripoli militias, IS and Al Qaida. Curb the malign influence of the city state of Misurata and bring the city state of Zintan into the fold.  

I would point out to him now, were he to read this, that there can be no democracy in Tripoli whilst it is dominated by armed militias which live by the sword. There will be no democracy whilst there is no independent functioning police force and no effective judiciary. What is more, there can be no democracy when Islamic extremists are given succour and people traffickers are allowed to operate without let or hindrance.

I am forced to agree with this piece which comes from the propaganda arm of Field Marshall Khalifa Hafter’s Libya National Army which is attacking Tripoli now. I would point out whilst doing so that Tripoli was my wife’s town where she was happiest and where the people she knew and worked with were law abiding and kindly. I was sometimes involved with the police and justice system in Tripoli and found it beginning to work effectively. It was a long time ago in the early days of Libya’s independence and there was a sense of promise and hope in the air. Where has all that hope gone now?

Here are the words of Lt. General Madi of the Libyan National Army as quoted in AdressLibya today:

 ‘Major General Idris Madi, commander of the western region of the Libyan National Army, said that residents of the cities of Libya’s western region support eliminating militias from Tripoli and the western region.

In statements to “Al-Ittihad” newspaper on Saturday, General Madi pointed out that Libyans are fully convinced that the civil state cannot exist in the presence of weapons in the possession of criminal gangs, Muslim Brotherhood, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – al-Qaeda, and extremist groups.

General Madi referred to a plan led by the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda in the southern region to stir up public opinion and convince the world that the geographical area controlled by the army is based on criminal and terrorist gangs.

He pointed out that the LNA involvement in the north and the non-unification of the political and military decision allows extremist groups to move and carry out limited operations intended to confuse and obfuscate the issues.

Major General Madi stressed the difficulty of the establishment of a civil state in Libya in the presence of armed militias and the spread of weapons outside the authority of the state and the relevant institutions under the law.

“Can a peaceful transfer of power occur in the presence of weapons directed at the people?” Madi said.’

Indeed so! 

John Oakes

12^th May 2019

LIBYA – CAN FIELD MARSHALL KHALIFA HAFTER TAKE TRIPOLI? (8TH APRIL 2019) (UPDATED 8TH MAY 2019)

HAFTER SHOWS HIS HAND AND THREATENS TRIPOLI

On 29th November 2017 I wrote this. ‘[Field Marshall Khalifa] Haftar’s communication chief, Colonel Ahmed Mismari, has stated that the Libyan National Army, is now preparing to go to Tripoli where it would be welcome by the people. He told the press that the ‘LNA’s new operational area was West Libya’, that is the old Province of Tripolitania, and preparations were now in hand for the ‘next phase’ of what he called the ‘decisive battle for the Libyan Army’. He implied that Haftar had given the politicians attempting to bring some form of stable and effective government into being six months to do so before the LNA moves to take over. It will be interesting to follow this battle as it develops. 

Haftar has kept his word. It is reported today – 7th April 2019 – that Hafter’s advanced forces are threatening Tripoli. They are said to have taken Gharian in the foothills of the Jebel Nefusa and some further reports today suggest his forward patrols may have been within 27Kms of Tripoli.

The powerful militias from Misurata, his sworn enemies, are reported to be on their way to Tripoli to stop his progress. The Misuratans appear to be aided by the Italians and some reports of transport aircraft operating between Italy and Misurata are coming in. Though confirmation is needed.

Hafet has secured Witya military airfield close to the Libyan border with Tunis.

There appear to have been some firefights in the vicinity of Tripoli’s international airport. 

NOTES ON HAFTER’S ATTACK ON TRIPOLI.

Dated 11th April 2019

Hafter’s forces attacking Tripoli are said to be commanded by Major General Abdul Salam al-Hassi supported by Major General Al Mabrouk al-Ghaziwi. Major General Wanis Bukhamada is leading his Saiqa Special Forces in the font line of the attack. Bukhamada’s Special Forces are a formidable unit having a great deal of experience in urban fighting during the recent battles for Benghazi and Derna. They may have benefited from the advice and training they received from French urban warfare experts.

It seems that Hafter’s mobile forces together with their commanders moved via the old trade route from Sebha in the Fezzan to Gharian in the Jebel Nefusa prior to the advance on Tripoli proper.

Italy, whose support for Hafter’s sworn enemies the Misuratan militias, appears to be opposing Hafter’s attack on Tripoli in diplomatic circles. France, on the other hand, has been supporting Hafter’s takeover of Sebha and much of the south east of Libya has thus been placed in a difficult position and has diplomatically urged both sides to stop fighting. Hafter’s forces are said to have a number of French military advisers. The Misuratans may have received ‘assistance’ from Italy. (Readers may recall that the Misuratans supported Hafter’s opponents in the battles to liberate Benghazi and Derna with supplies and military hardware.) In this context ‘The Libyan Address’ reported this today:-

‘PARIS – The Spokeswoman for the French Foreign Ministry said in an official statement that some groups and persons, classified on the United Nations sanctions list because of their terrorist acts, are involved in the fight in Tripoli against the Libyan National Army (LNA).

The Spokeswoman comments came in reference to the participation of persons classified internationally on sanctions list such as the smuggler known as Abdul Rahman al-Miladi, the commander of Al-Somoud Brigade from Misurata Salah Badi, Ibrahim Jidran and other extremists linked to Al-Qaeda such as Ziad Balaam who appeared in the battles within the forces of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA).’

Anyone with an interest in the conditions prevailing in Tripoli before Haftar’s attack would it find useful to read this well researched paper on the Tripoli militias before reaching a conclusion.

REINFORCEMENTS FOR HAFTAR’S LNA ARRIVE FROM BENI WALID

It is reported today – 12th April 2019 – that a large contingent of troops from Beni Walid has arrived to join Hafter’s forces attacking Tripoli. Beni Walid is the home of the Warfella tribe. The Warfella have long been at odds with the Misuratans. I wrote this on 29th November 2017:

‘As expected, he [Hafter] has reached an agreement with the Warfella tribe based around Beni Walid. He has raised the new 27th Infantry Brigade for recruits from the Warfella under the command of Colonel Abdulla al- Warfella. It is noted that the Warfella tribe was highly favoured under the Gaddafi regime. The new regiment is scheduled to undergo as period of training but it is clear that Hafter’s sphere of influence has been extended to one of Libya’s respected tribes with wide territorial influence. (This map will serve to show the location of the Warfella tribe’s homeland in Libya).

The leadership of the Warfella tribe under Sheikh Mohamad al-Barghouti has been notably withdrawn from the damaging armed discord which has bedevilled Libya since the downfall of the Gaddafi regime. A good piece about this by a noted Libyan journalist can be found here.

However, the tribe has long been at odds with the Misuratans who conducted a siege of Beni Walid in 2012 on the pretext of flushing out Gaddafists who were said to have been afforded refuge there. The story of the siege and something of the history of the enmity between the Warfella and the Misuratans may be found here.’

LOGISTICS – WILL RESUPPLY BE HAFTER’S ACHILLIES HEEL?  

Dated 13^th April 2019

Hafter has attacked Tripoli from the south. This means the supply lines from his base in Eastern Libya are very long. Some observers thought he would run out of fuel and ammunition unless he made a rapid and successful advance to take over his opponent’s logistics bases in Tripoli. His planners must have found a way to deal with the long distances and unfavourable terrain of his attenuated supply line. The coastal road from Benghazi to Tripoli is controlled by his opponents, the Misuratans, from Sirte westwards. This adds distance and rough terrain to his supply line. In order to outflank his opponents in Misurata, Hafter is forced to route his supply line from the east of Libya though the city of Hun. From road maps of Libya Hun can be seen to be a critical hub and his opponents have spotted his vulnerability here and are directing air strikes on and around the city.

I believe his forces are still (13^th April 2019) fighting to take over Tripoli’s international airport – my own place of work in the mid-20^th Century. Possession of this facility would allow him to build an air bridge and relieve some of his logistical problems. His planners have been notable successful in many ways. It will be interesting to find out how they handled the logistical conundrum that bedevilled the British and German armies in World War II. Or will logistics be his Achilles Heel?

Update 20th April 2019

Haftar’s opponents claimed yesterday (19^th April 2019) to have pushed his forces out of the logistical base in Gharian in the Jebel Nefusa. I await confirmation of what would be a catastrophic blow to Hafter’s Libyan National Army and would seriously interrupt its resupply rout.

HAS HAFTER BEEN LET DOWN BY HIS ERSTWHILE ALLIES IN ZINTAN?

Hafter’s sometime allies, the powerful militias from the city of Zintan situated in the Jebel Nefusa, have not appeared amongst his coalition of forces on his drive to take Tripoli. It appears that the Zintani elders were in favour of joining the attack alongside Hafter but the sometime Minister of Defence, Osama Juwaily, opposed them. Juwaily is a Zintani and was a army captain during Gaddafi’s rule. He has considerable influence in Zintan, and appears to have split the city’s militias which have so far kept out of the fray.

Some experts are arguing that Hafter had banked on the Zintani militias joining the battle on his side and suggest that his advance has been fatally flawed as a result. However there had been indications of Juwaily’s alignment for some time and I suggest that Haftar was aware of his loyalties.

Update 23rd April 2019

At least two reliable sources report that Major General Idris Madi (Apparently commander of the Western Region) is leading a large force from Zintan in the Jebel Nefusa to join Hafter”s attack on Tripoli. It seems that the issues which have restrained the formidable Zintanis from joining Hafter have somehow been resolved.

Some deatailed background about the Zintani militas and the connection between Zintan and Italy can be found here:

https://jamestown.org/brief/look-commander-zintan-military-council-osama-al-juwaili/

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TRIPOLI ATTEMPTS TO ATTACK HAFTER’S EXTENDED LINES

I suspect this is the first sign of General Ali Kanna and his Tuareg militias. The pro Tripoli ‘Southern Protection Force’ attacked Tamanhint airbase near Sebha on or about the 17^th April and Hafter’s forces retreated, regrouped and returned. They are said to have regained possession of the airbase. It is clear that Tripoli is endeavouring to harass Hafter. Some relevant information about Ali Kanna can be found here.

Reports of further reinforcements arriving at Hafter’s forward base in Gharian make it clear that he is able to attract support.

HAFTER’S POWERFULL INTERNATIONAL ALLIES

THE USA

Hafter has dual US and Libyan citizenship. President Trump and Hafter have recently conferred by phone. Trump expressed his support for Hafter’s drive to take Tripoli undermining at a stroke the efforts of the British and Italians to raise a UN resolution condemning the use of force in Tripoli. This has changed the game radically and tipped it in favour of Hafter.

This cautionary piece in Bloomberg dated 25^th April 2019 is worth reading in this context. It suggests that there is some disagreement between President Trump and the US State Department about Hafter

FRANCE

For some time, France has been supporting Hafter. They see the threat of IS and similar Islamic extremists now embedded in Libya’s lawless south as threats to the old French Empire states of Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso thus as dangers to France. They have a considerable armed presence in the Sahel region, and they are aware that Islamist groups operating in Southern Libya draw support from allies in Tripoli. Hafter has moved to dominate Libya’s south west and will attempt to eradicate the Islamist groups. The French propose to support him.

Update 2^nd April 2019:

This appeared in ‘Adress Libya’ today:-

Speaking in an exclusive interview with Le Figaro, – France’s Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian said:-

“For a long time, since the French operation Serval 2013 in Mali, we have realized that most weapons came from Libya and that many groups had back bases, starting with AQIM,” said Le Drian, using the acronym of the terror group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Remember, al-Qaeda became dominant in Benghazi, US Ambassador Chris Stevens was killed in the same city in 2012, and Daesh [aka ISIS] then infiltrated Libyan territories,” he said.“I had alerted from September 2014, in an interview with Le Figaro, on the terrorist risks and on the possibility of local implementation of Daesh. This is exactly what happened: Daesh occupied several Libyan cities and even threatened, at one time, to get its hands on the oil resources.”

“Since May 2014, LNA, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, conducted one military operation after another and successfully hunted ISIS and other terrorist groups from one city to the next. LNA first defeated the so-called Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, a militia alliance which included the group responsible for the attack that killed the U.S. ambassador, after two-month long battle in Benghazi.In October 2014, the terrorist group ISIS took control of numerous government buildings, security vehicles and local landmarks in Derna. LNA launched a military operation in 2015 which successfully liberated the city from ISIS, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.”

“LNA forces and local police began to impose security in previously lawless cities one by one until finally dominating all of Cyrenaica and securing the country’s vital oil resources.Earlier this year, LNA mobilized its forces towards the southern region of Fezzan in response to calls made by residents who suffered from the criminal acts of local militias and Chadian armed rebel groups. The residents of Fezzan quickly embraced LNA, which enabled its forces to take control of the region in less than three months.”

“LNA continues its territorial expansion with its recent operation to liberate Tripoli. In addition to France, other international powers such as the United States, Russia and China have signaled their support for LNA’s operation.”

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND SAUDI ARABIA

Both states are supporting Hafter with funds and military hardware. It has been reported that drones have been used at night by Hafter’s forces to bomb his enemies in Tripoli. Hafter’s aged Russian fighter aircraft are incapable of operating at night. Reuters is carrying reports from a number of Tripoli residents who say they heard drones circling the city for 10 minutes before opening fire. These reports, and the unusual accuracy of the attacks, are leading some experts  to believe that UAE drones were used.

Update 8^th May 2019

Today there are a some widely circulated reports about the drone attack on targets south of Tripoli on the night of 19/20^th April. It appears that there are photographs of parts of a Blue Arrow 7 laser-guided missile amongst the target debris. This has led investigators to attribute the strike to a Chinese manufactured Wing Loong drone operated by the UAE. The UAE is known to have Wing Loong drones armed with BA 7 missiles, as have China and Kazakhstan. Egypt, according to some, also may also have Wing Loong drones armed with BA 7 missiles but corroboration is needed. The UN Security Council will view the usse of the drone and missile as a violation of the arms embargo currently imposed on Libya.   An interesting piece about these weapons can be found here.

EGYPT

The Egyptian President Sisi has been a longstanding and steadfast ally of Hafter. He is aware of the influence exerted in Tripoli by the Muslim Brotherhood and it is clear that he needs a stable and sympathetic neighbour on his western border. He has enough trouble with Islamists in the Saini on his eastern border and the Sudan has not been a sympathetic neighbour in the south. I believe he has communicated his reasons for supporting Hafter to Germany’s Angela Merkel.

RUSSIA

Russia is playing its usual canny game by supporting Hafter in the UN. It is also courting Hafter’s favour with inexpensive but effective gestures and, some say, supplying Russian mercenaries to train Hafter’s military. Hafter himself trained in Russia at an early stage in his career.

HAFTER’S POWERFUL ENEMIES

QATAR

It is clear that the Al Thani family who rule Qatar has purchased considerable support in Libya. Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia are uneasy about the effect Qatar is having in Libya and in the Middle East in general. Some sources suggest that the total value of Qatari arms to militants in Libya is estimated at 750 million euros between 2011 and 2017. This long but interesting report is illuminating in this context:

https://www.refworld.org/docid/596c92b64.html

TURKEY

The Ottoman/Turkish occupation of Libya began in 1551 and ended when the Italians replaced them in 1912. The main value for the Ottomans was in the profits of the trans Saharan slave trade which was not extinguished (in Benghazi at least) until 1911. Ottoman Tripoli was also a base for Barbary Corsairs which harried merchant ships in the Mediterranean. The Turks have, therefore, an historic interest in Libya. The Islamist nature of Turkey’s present government seems to have persuaded it to conspire with Qatar against Hafter. Turkey has recently stationed a warship in close proximity to Tripoli and another close offshore Misurata. This seems like a belligerent act against Hafter.

Update 28th April 2019

A spokesperson for Hafter’ Libyan National Army made this statment on 27th April:

‘During the past week, LNA was able to arrest a number of Turkish armed elements who were fighting alongside the Tripoli militias, in a development that seems to confirm the direct involvement of the Erdoğan government in the Libyan conflict. Many of the passports of the Turkish elements were seized by LNA forces.’

Update 5th May 2019

There are some reports of the presence of a large number of Syrian made M-302 artillery missiles in the hands of militias apposing Hafter’s LNA on the approaches to Tripoli. These missiles (also referred to as the Khaibar-1 rocket about which little is known outside Syria and, some imply, Iran) were said to have been imported in April into Libya on the Iranian cargo ship Shahr E Kord through the port of Misurata. Some experts are connecting this shipment of arms with Turkey. 

BACKING TWO HORSES IN A FATAL RACE ?

ITALY – ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA

Italy has been investing time and resources in courting the two powerful city states of western Libya outside the capital Tripoli. Libya’s third largest city is Misurata. Its militias fought a protracted and bloody battle against Gaddafi in 2011. The city was badly battered, and its people suffered greatly. The Misuratan militias became experienced and formidable fighting units. Since that time, they have been involved in Tripoli and were the winners of a war with the militias of the other powerful city state, Zintan, situated in the Jebel Nefusa. The Zintani militias are also battle hardened and well-armed.

Italy, the sometime colonial power in Libya, has found it expedient to court both the Misuratans and the Zintanis with military and financial support. Hafter has allied himself with the Zintani’s and probably counted on their support when he planned his attack on Tripoli. They appear to have hesitated to join his attack but are now engaged on his side. The Misuratans on the other hand are opposing Hafter.

Italy is thus on the horns of a dilemma. It is also experiencing internal political tensions and suffering from a great influx of migrants who set off to cross the Mediterranean from western Libya.

LIBYA – TRIPOLI AND THE PERILS OF URBAN WARFARE (28^TH APRIL 2019)

There is something especially horrible about urban warfare today. There are a few readable papers on the subject which are worth a few moments to those who recognise that urban warfare represents one of the great shifts in how armies fight each other. They are found here and here. Here is a quote from the latter:

‘The nature of the battlefield is as complex as the enemies within it. Urban environments in particular—with dense populations, narrow streets, subterranean passages, and multi-storey buildings that serve as enemy defensive positions—pose significant challenges for mechanised infantry assault forces and have traditionally been avoided when at all possible.’

‘A multi-storied building may take up the same surface area as a small field, but each story or floor contains approximately an equal area as the ground upon which it sits. In effect, a ten-story building can have eleven times more defensible area than “bare” ground—ten floors and the roof. Buildings and other urban structures, damaged but not destroyed, can become (or remain) effective obstacles and possible booby traps.Roofs and other super surface areas may also provide excellent locations for snipers; lightweight, handheld antitank weapons; MANPADS; and communications retransmission sites. They enable top-down attacks against the weakest points of armoured vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft.’

‘Subsurface areas include subterranean areas such as subways, mines, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems, cellars, civil defence shelters, and other various underground utility systems. In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug tunnels and catacombs. Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and manoeuvre against the rear and flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes. However, these areas are often the most restrictive and easiest to defend or block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their existence and overall design Many threats will integrate widely available off-the-shelf technologies into their weapon systems and armed forces. However, sniper rifles and small, man-portable, fire-and-forget weapons and demolitions and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to include suicide and car bombs, will likely dominate the urban environment.’

As this piece is being written Hafter’s forces are attempting the fight their way from the southern suburban centers on five fronts into down town Tripoli. Reports indicate that the main battle front stretches across Ain Zara, Khalat Al-Furjan, Aziziya, Wadi Rabea and Gasr Ben Ghashir. The last, Ben Gashir, some twenty miles south of down town Tripoli, is in the vicinity of the cities long disused international airport and most of the battle front is in the Tarhuna tribal area.

The dark side of urban warfare is clearly illustrated by this extract from the report dated 26^th April by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:

‘About 1,700 Internally Displaced (IDP) children have been reached with psychosocial assistance and more than 37,500 persons have now fled their homes as a result of the fighting around the borders of Tripoli. There are at least 90 civilian casualties, including 21 verified fatalities since the beginning of the conflict. These casualties include medical personnel, women and children, and at least one foreign national.

The conflict has significantly affected the capacity of hospitals and primary health centres with some medical personnel leaving the health facilities, thus hindering the capacity of the health system to respond to increasing needs. Specialized health workers are particularly needed. Armed actors and security institutions have restricted freedom of movement and increased security check toward the civilian population. IDPs who originate from Eastern Libya, the home of Hafter’s LNA, are being targeted as potential combatants or being politically allied to Hafter.’

TARHUNA – A CHANGE OF ALLEGANCE

In an attempt to predict Hafter’s plan for his advance on Tripoli I wrote this about Tarhuna on 29^th October 2017. (I declare an interest in the region as one of my duties whilst serving with the British Royal Air Force in the 1960s brought me into occasional contact with a facility called the Tarhuna Range.):-

‘No doubt his intelligence people have made a thorough assessment of the Tarhuna tribal leadership and its likely allegiances. From the observer’s standpoint the outstanding problem is the Kani militia which dominates the tribe and has the Tarhuna town council in its pocket. The Kani militia claims to be Islamist but there are some who observe its operations with scepticism and suggest it has a record of revenge killings and involvement in shady trading. It does seem to be unscrupulous in practice. Haftar’s people will have noted that the Kani militia was allied to the Misuratan militias in Operation Libyan Dawn during which the Haftar’s allies, the Zintani militias, were beaten out of Tripoli and wanton destruction of aircraft and property took place at Tripoli’s international airport. An excellent paper on the battle between Haftar’s forces and those of Libya Dawn may be found here. It is the alliance between the Kani and the Misuratans which must exercise the minds of Haftar’s planners.

It was clear at the time I wrote the above that Hafter had made and alliance with the Warfella tribe based at Beni Walid. Between the Warfella and Tripoli lay the Tarhunans. Hafter would have to approach Tripoli through their tribal lands to outflank his powerful enemies in Misurata. Hafter’s luck was with him. The Kani militia attacked the Tripoli militias recently and underwent a change of heart. See here and here for some background. The Tarhunans were clearly brought into an alliance with Hafter thus opening the southern approaches to Tripoli. That must have been an interesting negotiation and may have involved a number of promises Hafter will have to honour later should he win.

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LIBYA – DANGEROUS STILL (A work in progress commenced 19th September 2018) (Updated 12th April 2019)

SOME NOTES ON LIBYA’S LAWLESS SOUTH

Units from the Special Forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) left the city of Benghazi a few nights ago to commence operations in the south of Libya. They are under the command of Major General Wanis Bukhamada who has been tasked by the Libyan National Army Commander to open an ‘Operations Room’ at the Tamanhint Air Force base a short way south east of Sebha in the Fezzan. Field Marshal Khalifa Hafter has instructed him to ‘secure the south of Libya and eliminate terrorist gangs, criminals and mercenaries, and to combat smuggling of arms and drugs and people trafficking’. Bukhamada is a formidable fighting soldier who was prominent in the recapture of Benghazi from Islamist militias and the near complete clearance of Jihadists from Derna. (News about him is occasionally found here.) Formidable as he may be, there is no doubt that he has a very tough job to do. To project military power over long distances is not easy, especially in Libya.

Not the least of his problems is the geography. Libya may be on the coast of North Africa but much of it is in the Sahara. For a country with a landmass of 679,500 or so square miles it has a small population. In 2011 it was estimated to be 6,276,632 most of whom live on the Mediterranean coast. Libya borders Tunis and Algeria to the west, Chad and Niger to the South and Egypt and the Sudan to the East. Clearly it is a big country not much of which is hospitable. Since the fall of Ghaddafi in 2011 the south has been largely out of control.

Field Marshal Haftar has made progress in the south eastern city of  Kufra which is some 1020 kilometres from Benghazi and where units associated with the Libyan National Army have been for some months under the command of the Kufra Military Zone Commander, Brigadier Belgasim Al Abaj. Brigadier Al Abaj took up his post there on 16^th April 2018. I believe he is a member of the Zawiya tribe  which has dominated the Kufra oasis complex for a very long time indeed. He was also Gaddafi’s Chief of Intelligence in Kufra which makes him a particularly interesting character.

We know that the factors which attract al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State are a weak or remote central government, a divided national army, a weak and corrupt police force, intertribal strife, a safe haven in remote and rough terrain, access to criminal enterprises such as smuggling and capturing foreigners for ransom, poverty, neglect and native Salafist sympathisers. The fall of Gaddafi’s dictatorship in 2011 followed by political instability offers armed and ruthless groups a perfect place to laager in the ungoverned vastness of Southern Libya. The Tibesti Mountains of northern Chad and Southern Libya may be particularly tempting for hardcore Jihadists and rebel groups with malign intent who seek remote bad lands in which to hide and thrive.

What do we know about Bukhamada’s enemies? Very little but we can make inferences from the scarce evidence available in the public domain. In April 2015 I wrote this. 

‘However, there is another threat which needs attention. It is the purpose of this blog to warn against ‘Islamic State’ exploitation of the lawless southern regions of Libya. These regions, which border on the Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali and Algeria, would offer a haven for IS and allow it to exercise a perceived influence far in excess of its real power. Should they fetch up there they would find a source of revenue in the trafficking of drugs, arms and people. They would also make formidable ally for Nigerian based Boko Haram which is currently attempting to expand into Mali. It could also exploit the unrest amongst the Tuaregs and to this end has begun to post propaganda in Tamahaq. 

 Once established in southern Libya the ‘Islamic State’ could threaten to mount attacks on the Algerian natural gas complex, Libyan oil installations and the Nigerian yellow cake Uranium mines. Perhaps a lodgement of Islamic State in southern Libya would prompt an intervention by the Sahel states and would, no doubt, disturb the Algerians and could bring the French, who have troops stationed in the region, into play.

It is significant – but somewhat late in the day – that on 5^th September 2018 the United Nations representative in Libya, Ghassan Salame, addressed the UN Security Council. He was unhappy about the security situation in Libya. Here is what Mr Salame told the UN Security Council:

‘In recent weeks, Chadian Government and Chadian opposition forces have been fighting, operating from Southern Libya. Over 1,000 fighters have been involved in the hostilities, risking the South becoming a regional battle ground and safe haven for foreign armed groups, including terrorist organizations. The recent agreement signed between Chad, Sudan, Niger and Libya needs to be implemented so Libya does not also become an alternative battleground for others. The signatories have asked for support from the International Community for the implementation of these agreements, and I hope that Council members will positively consider their request.’

On 24^th August Reuters was reporting: ‘Rebels in northern Chad attacked government forces this week at the border with Libya, the fighters and two military sources said on Friday, although the government denied an attack had taken place.’ The rebel force appears to be the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic [of Chad] (CCMSR), which seeks to overthrow President Idriss Deby. The CCMSR claims to have 4,500 fighters and was founded in 2014. It is said to include former rebels from the Darfur region of neighbouring Sudan. Some background on this group can be found here.

What can the redoubtable Major General Bukhamada and his special forces do to clear the region of IS, Al Qaeda, CCMSR fighters, people traffickers and other malign groups? I suspect he will commence by recruiting the Tebu militias in the region.

Firstly, therefore, a word about the Tebu. The Tebu people who live in the vicinity of Kufra, Sebha and Muzuq are part of a wider ethnic group called the Teda, desert warriors living in the eastern and central Sahara and, effectively, a black people without nationality. The majority of them can be found in the Tibesti Mountains on the Libyan-Chad border. Their harsh environment, extreme poverty, and remote location make them a very tough people. They have often clashed with the neighbouring tribes and with the Tuareg and, like the gypsies in Great Britain, are despised by the dominant communities who see them as petty thieves and liars. Traditionally, the Teda controlled the caravan trade routes that passed through their territory. They were widely known in the past for plundering and salve trading. Their language is Tebu and their basic social unit is the nuclear family, organized into clans. They live by a combination of pastoralism, farming, substance smuggling and date cultivation. They have formed a number of militias some of which have joined Field Marshall Hafter’s Libyan National Army, but others operate in their own interests in the region. This map will serve as a good guide to the parts of Libya occupied by the Tebu and the Tuareg and a fair idea of the tribal homelands of the Arab and Berber tribes of Libya.

The Tebu know, and have recently been in control of, much of Southern Libya and it is why it might be amongst Bukhamada’s first tasks to recruit the Tebu militias. In this he has a troublesome obstacle to overcome in the shape of mercenaries from neighbouring Chad, Niger and the Sudanese province of Darfur all of whom have their own agendas and are now operating in Libya’s south. They have been taking control of the Tebu clans and the municipal councils of the Tebu towns such as Qaroon, Murzuq, Traagin, and Um Aramyb. They are clearly attracted by the lucrative people trafficking business and the smuggling opportunities presented by the open borders.

Sources amongst Field Marshal Hafter’s enemies are suggesting that irregular units attached to his Libyan National Army contain fighters from the Sudan province of Darfur who may have been part of the ruthless Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). I am unable to corroborate this, but should it be true they might provide Major General Bukhamada with some useful insights. He may have other contacts from Chad and Niger ‘up his sleeve’.  Loyalties amongst entrepreneurial Militias are fluid in Libya today.

(There are other significant groups operating in Libya’s lawless south of which the two most important are the Aulad Sulieman and the Tuaregs of which more later).

John Oakes

28^th September 2018

UPDATE 8^TH FEBRUARY 2019

HAFTER STIRS UP A HORNET’S NEST IN THE FEZZAN

These three reports (see below) demonstrate how Hafter’s Libyan National Army has pushed its way into a hornet’s nest of tribal and ethnic rivalries and drawn the Tripoli based Government of National Accord into a conflict around the old provence of the Fezzan and the South Western oil fields. Hafter has clearly been unable to reach an accord with the Tuareg military leader Ali Kanna who appears to be opposing him with the support of the Tripoli based government. The Arab tribes are also engaged in the conflict including the Awlad Suleiman and the Zawia. The Tebu are at odds with each other and the remnants of the Islamic State are clearly making mischief. Thrown into the conflict are militias attempting to destabilise Chad and thus the conflict may draw the French into the mix.

 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/08/conflict-erupts-for-control-of-libyas-largest-oil-field

https://www.libyaherald.com/2019/02/08/tensions-rise-in-south-as-multiplicity-of-forces-enter-the-power-play/

Click to access SANA-Dispatch3-Libyas-Fractious-South.pdf

 

HAFTER’S PROGRESS

Updated 2^nd April 2019

An excellent piece of journalism by a trusted Libyan academic which tells us much about Field Marshall Hafter’s relationship with the Aulad Suleiman tribe and his occupation of Sebha, the capital of the Fezzan, can be found here. I will later argue that there are hazards in relying on the Aulad Suleiman tribe not the least of which is its bad relationship with the Tuareg. Hafter appears to have been wrong footed by his rivals in Tripoli and the Tuareg General Ali Kanna and thwarted in his efforts to dominate the oil fields in the Merzuq Basin in South West Libya.

Updated 14th April 2010

There are two major oil fields in the Muzurq basin, El Fil (The elephant) and the Sharara.

According to Bloomberg, Hafter’s forces took over the Sahara oil field peacefully from a group which had closed the field down in a protest about their wages.  Here is part of Bloomberg’s report updated 12^th February 2019;

Forces loyal to Libya’s eastern leader Khalifa Haftar have taken control of the country’s biggest oil field and say the deposit is secure and ready to resume production.

Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army fanned out in the southwestern Sharara field, people with knowledge of the matter confirmed. Armed protesters had closed down the 300,000 barrel-per-day deposit in December, demanding more money and investment in the remote region.

“Sharara is completely secure and ready to resume pumping,” LNA spokesman Ahmed al-Mismari said Tuesday in a telephone interview. “The guards at the field handed over the field to our forces peacefully.”

The LNA had pledged earlier to hand the field over to the National Oil Corp. once it was fully secured.

It is said that forces loyal to Hafter are in control of the El Fil field but some reports suggest that their tenure is disputed. He has trusted the Tariq ibn Ziyad Battalion of the Libyan National Army to take El Fil (El Feel) and hold it against determined opposition.  Hafter must hope the battalion is as formidable as its name implies. Tariq ibn Ziyad was a famous military commander who conquered southern Spain from the Visigoths in the 8^th Century. Gibraltar is named after him. The name is an Anglicization of Jebel Tariq. 

In this context it would be interesting to know what the Tuareg militias controlled by Ali Kanna are planning to do.  

 

SOME NOTES ON SEBHA

The modern town of Sebha has developed from the three oasis settlements of Jedid, Quatar and Hejer and now houses a population of around 200,000. It is the seat of the Saif al Nasr family, the most prominent and revered leaders of the Awlad Sulieman tribe and its historic allies and clients. The Saif al Nasr family gained heroic status in its wars with their Ottoman Turk overlords in the early 19th century and with the Italian colonists in the early 20th Century.
Gaddafi’s father migrated from Sirte to Sebha to take menial employment with the Saif al Nasr family, something which his son was said to resent. Gaddafi attended secondary school in Sebha and staged his first anti government demonstration as a school boy in the city. He also held a demonstration in the lobby of a hotel owned by the Saif al Nasr family, thus ensuring his expulsion from school. The relationship between Sebha and Gaddafi was ambiguous!
The Saif al Nasr family and the Awlad Suleiman tribe it led were the dominate force in Sebha and in much of the Fezzan throughout the Ottoman Turkish regency (1551 – 1911), the Italian colonial period (1911 – 1943), the short period (1943 – 1951) of French military government after WWII and the Kingdom of Libya (1951 -1969). During the forty or so years of the Gaddafi era the dominance in the Fezzan of the Awlad Suleiman was reversed in favour of his own tribe, the Gaddadfa and that of his closest supporters, the Maqarha tribe. This process has been dubbed ‘tribal inversion’ by Jason Pack and his colleges writing in their book ‘The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future’. This book is essential reading but somewhat expensive.
Apart from a number of so called al Ahali, the name given to long time town dwellers, Sebha offers a home to people from other tribes such as the Gaddadfa, Muammar Gaddafi’s tribe, which is based near Sirte but ranges south towards Sebha. There are also colonies of the Maqarha from the Wadi Shati to the north, the Awlad Abu Seif and the Hasawna tribe who, in the past, were the true nomads of the south and allies of the Awlad Suleiman.
There is one district of Sebha which has been a source of discord for some time. It is the Tauri district which is colonised by some Tuareg and many Tebu. The Tebu people are part of a wider ethnic group called the Teda, desert warriors living in the eastern and central Sahara and, effectively, a black people without nationality. The majority of them can be found in the Tibesti Mountains on the Libyan-Chad border. Their harsh environment, extreme poverty, and remote location make them a very tough people. They have often clashed with the neighbouring tribes and with the Tuareg and, like the gypsies in Great Britain, are despised by the dominant communities who see them as petty thieves and liars.
Traditionally, the Teda controlled the caravan trade routes that passed through their territory. They were widely known in the past for plundering and salve trading. Their language is Tebu and their basic social unit is the nuclear family, organized into clans. They live by a combination of pastoralism, farming, subsistence smuggling and date cultivation.
Since the fall of Gaddafi, Tebu militias have come to dominate the South and Libya’s borders with Chad and Niger. They are perceived by the majority of the inhabitants of Sebha to be non Libyans trying to control the city. In particular they now dominate the majority of the trade (legal and illicit) routes between Sebha and the Chad basin. Thus they have a firm grip on the regional arms and drug trade and on people trafficking. The Awlad Suleiman tribesman may still have their own trade routes in this area but perceive the Tebu to be a foreign and ethnically inferior threat to their historic dominance of the region.

HAFER’S LONG SHOT

Updated 5th Apirl 2019

There are some good people writing about Field Marshall Hafter’s recent move into the old province of the Fezzan. I have linked readers to the best in previous blog pieces. In simple terms Haftar has taken the cities of Sebha and Murzuq around the middle of March and pushed his forces forward to threaten or occupy towns of Quatrun, Umm Al Aranib, Ghat, and Awaynat. I so doing he has placed himself in a dominant position across the main trans Saharan roads leading from western Chad and eastern Niger to the Mediterranean ports. In so doing he is in a dominant position to control or eliminate much of the people trafficking, smuggling and legitimate business traffic from the Sahel countries. He also threatens the oil fields in the Murzuk Basin to his north and should he succeed in dominating them he would gain control nearly 90% of Libya’s oil riches. His advance forces are at least 965Kms from his main stronghold in Benghazi!

 

BOOKS BY JOHN OAKES For books by John Oakes see… (USA): http://www.amazon.com/John-Oakes/e/B001K86D3O/ref=ntt_athr_dp_pel_1 ….. (UK): http://www.amazon.co.uk/JohOakes/e/B001K86D3O/ref=ntt_athr_dp_pel_pop_1

 

LIBYA – IS FIELD MARSHAL KHALIFA HAFTAR STRONG ENOUGH TO RULE ? (UPDATED 21st JUNE 2018)

On 18^th December 2017 the British newspaper, the Times, ran a piece on Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar which opened with these words.

‘The most powerful military commander in Libya has declared the internationally recognised government redundant and suggested that he should run the country.

In a speech likely to lead to further chaos in the already fractured nation Khalifa Haftar, whose forces control most of east Libya, claimed that a 2015 UN-brokered peace deal had expired, rendering the government that emerged from it illegitimate.

In an address broadcast from his headquarters in Benghazi, General Haftar said: “All bodies resulting from this agreement automatically lose their legitimacy, which has been contested from the first day they took office.”

Acknowledging that the country was now at an “historic and dangerous turning point”, he hinted that he would consider filling the political void by running for president.’

 

 

FIELD MARSHAL KHALIFA HAFTAR LAUNCHES A BID FOR POWER

There is an intense diplomatic effort underway to settle Libya’s brutal and persistent civil war. The Egyptian President, who has much to lose if it fails, has led the charge. The Gulf States and Tunisia are playing prominent roles in the negotiations. The Gulf States were deeply involved in the hasty intervention which led to Gaddafi’s downfall but which set off a predictable and bloody civil and religious war. For some time now it has been apparent that Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and his Libyan National Army, has been gaining control over much of Eastern Libya and he can no longer be referred to as a renegade general. He is now a major, but strangely divisive, factor to be accounted for if Libya is to have a future. The opposing parties in Libya’s armed chaos are weary as are the ordinary Libyans. It is time to sort things out. There are several biographies of the Field Marshal online. The BBC carries  this one on it’s news site. You may wish to read it before proceeding further.

Most of the commentary about Haftar is written from the Tripolitanian, that is Western Libyan, point of view. Tripoli is, and has long been, the major city and political hub of Libya. The UN has focused its attention there as has the EU amongst others. It seems to me that there are few commentators writing today with experience of living in Eastern Libya. Perhaps you will permit me to write a piece about Haftar from a Cyrenaican perspective.

In January 2012, soon after the fall of Gaddafi, I wrote a piece for my publisher’s blog entitled ‘Is a Strongman Necessary in Libya?’ Since then Field Marshall Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, at the head of his Libyan National Army, has dominated the old province of Cyrenaica, now called Eastern Libya.  He now appears to hold sway over Libya’s Oil Crescent around the southern shore of the Gulf of Sirte. In this regard, he has a strangle hold over Libya’s principle, and almost only, source of revenue.

I argue that Haftar’s military campaign to drive out militant Islamists needs the support of tribal leaders and elders. Haftar is a member of the Farjan tribe. His fellow tribesmen can be found from Sirte to Benghazi. Haftar’s brother is the leader of the Benghazi Farjani’s. Why should this matter today? It matters because tribal affiliations are still important in Libya, especially so in Cyrenaica. (This map, though complicated, will serve to show the major tribal homelands in Libya.)

There is a tribal hierarchy at the top of which sit the nine Sa’adi tribes, so called after Sa’ada of the Beni Sulaim, their ancestress. (Some sources call her Soada Al Hilaliya). The Beni Sulaim and Beni Hilal tribes migrated into Libya from the Najd in the early part of the 11^th Century. The nine Sa’adi tribes hold their territory by right of conquest. Other tribes live amongst the Sa’adi tribes as clients. They are known as Marabtin tribes. The Farjan is a client tribe of a special nature, being classed as one of the Marabtin bil baraka, tribes of the blessing. They, like the Aulad al-Sheik and the Masamir, live amongst the Sa’adi tribes as equals because of their supposed descent from saints. The Sa’adi’s, however, do not regard them as ‘quite like themselves’ as they are not of Bedouin descent, their ancestor having supposedly migrated into Libya from the Maghreb.

In a civil war, and the troubles in Libya are partly that, leaders must watch their backs. In Libya losing the loyalty of leading tribes would be a folly. We may note that Gaddafi tried to maintain some semblance of order by giving senior military posts to leading personages of his favoured tribes. Haftar was recently forced to reinstate Colonel Faraj Al-Barasi after he had sacked him twice from operational posts. He was pressured into doing so by the Colonel’s own tribe, the Bara’asa, and by its allies the Darsa, the Hasa and the Obeidat. To have alienated those tribes would have meant Haftar could suffer a notable loss of support in territory stretching from just north east of his headquarters at al-Marj to the Egyptian border.

It is not without significance that much of Libya’s oil crescent is in the homeland of the al-Magharba tribe, one of the nine Sa’adi tribes. Al-Magharba territory reaches as far eastwards as Ajdabia, Haftar’s place of birth. The support of Magharba tribal elders is crucial factor in Hafter’s all important hold on the oil ports and the strategically important city of Ajdabia. He will make sure, therefore, that he maintains close and cordial relations with the leading families of the Magharba such as the Latiawish.

Haftar’s avowed aim is to rid Libya of militant Islamists. Ranged against him is Dar Al-Ifta head Sheik Sadiq al-Ghariani, Libya’s hard-line Grand Mufti. Sheik Ghariani is based in Tripoli and has his own TV station from whence he preaches recklessly throughout Libya.  He appears to be unassailable and is strongly suspected of supporting Salafist-Jihadist organisation in Eastern Libya. Whilst they vary in influence I find these to be the most interesting at the time of writing.

Derna, the small city and port on the north coast of East Libya, has long been a haven for Salafist-Jihadists. Some three years ago I wrote this in a blog piece about Derna.  ‘Today, barring an unforeseen accident, Derna is the lair an Islamist warlord called Sufian Ben Qumu. Ben Qumu’s ‘private’ militia amalgamated with two other radical Islamist armed groups, the Army of the Islamic State of Libya and the Derna branch of Ansar Sharia, to form the Shura Council of Islamic Youth. There are strong elements within this amalgamated group which have ties to Al Qaida. The Shura Council of Islamic Youth has gained a reputation for violence and militancy. It has carried out at least two public executions in Derna which have been condemned by Amnesty International’

Since I wrote the above Derna has had the doubtful pleasure of a period of Islamic State rule. The IS folk were evicted and the city is now ruled by the Shura Council of Muhajadeen in Derna. I suggest it is likely that this organisation has evolved from the Shura Council of Islamic Youth and has strong connections with Ansar Sharia and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Derna is geographically isolated and I suspect the Haftar has it well contained and will try to deal with it later, avoiding collateral damage as far as possible. He cannot leave the problem unresolved much longer.

Notable in this regard are the reports coming from inside Libya that the Egyptian Air Force has made two bombing raids on Islamist strongholds in Derna recently. The last was on the morning of the 29^th May.  The raids were made in conjunction with Haftar’s Libyan National Army and aimed at strategically important points controlled by Derna’s Mujahadeen Shura Council. The Egyptians had been exasperated by murderous attacks on their Coptic Churches which, they believe, were carried out by terrorists based or trained near Derna. Egypt has now shown its support for Haftar in no uncertain terms

Haftar’s three year long campaign to remove Islamist-Jihadist forces from Benghazi has been successful. It has been protracted because of the nature of guerrilla warfare in cities.Those interested in what is a relatively modern military problem will find this paper worth reading. It has also been hampered by Haftar’s lack of a navy thus allowing reinforcements and supplies to reach the militants from Misrata, across the Gulf of Sirte. Benghazi now has a relatively stable municipal government led by its acting mayor, Abdelrahmen el-Abbar. The Abbar family is prominent in the Awaquir tribe. The Awaquir is one of the nine  Sa’adi tribes and its homeland surrounds Benghazi. Hafter must be concerned that pockets of militants remain in Benghazi’s Sabri and Suq al-Hout districts.  His Libyan National Army spearheaded by experienced special force launched an attack on militants in these two districts on 8th May 2017.

Particularly interesting now is the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. In my view this body has Ansar Sharia as its mainstay and is likely to be allied to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is its connection with the Benghazi Defence Brigades which must trouble Haftar. They were formed under the banner of Sheik Sadiq Ghariani and appear to be based in or near Misrata. This unit was strong enough to take Haftar’s forces unawares and evict them briefly from the important Oil Crescent facilities of Ben Jawad and Nuflia. It is also supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and thus by ‘political Islam’.

Is Khalifa Haftar strong enough to rule Libya? He has repeatedly stated that he does not wish to do so. Should he attempt to do so he may not receive sufficient international support. I have drawn attention to only some of those who pose a danger to him in his own back yard.  There are many more obstacles in the way of a settlement in Libya. However, Haftar must be counted amongst those who may achieve a solution. Of note is the spate of ambassadors who have visited him in recent weeks.  They are Ambassadors Peter Millet of the UK, Brigitte Curmi of France, Guiseppe Perrone of Italy and Eric Strating of Holland. The UN Special Envoy to Libya, Martin Kobler, also visited recently. It is my view that Haftar will not have compromised on  his clear and determined claim to the command of all Libya’s armed forces. We will see how all this works out soon.

WHAT WILL FIELD MARSHAL KHALIFA HAFTAR DO NEXT? (Further notes added 13^th June 2017)

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces are now in possession of the Brak Al-Shatti and Jufra airbases in Southern and Central Libya. Effectively they took them from the Misuratan based 13^th Brigade and Mustafa Al-Sharksi’s Benghazi Defence Brigade which had deployed ruthless tactics. The 13^th Brigade is said to have withdrawn to its base in Misurata and the Benghazi Defence Brigade to Sabratha to the west of Tripoli.

Once Haftar’s advance troops have made the airfields safe, cleared their approaches and organised the logistics, he will be able to position his warplanes within striking distance of Misurata and Tripoli. He can also use his transport aircraft to ferry in material and reinforcements to build up a strong foothold in Central Libya. This shifts his strategic outlook considerably but it gives Haftar a new set of political and tribal considerations peculiar to the South and West of the country.

Let us look at it now from the tribal point of view. Brak al-Shati is in the territory of the Magarha tribe to which belonged Abdulbaset al-Magrahi, the convicted Lockerby bomber. Notable amongst the tribe’s sons is Abdulla Senussi, Gaddafi’s brother in law and intelligence supremo and Major Abdessalam Jalloud, Gaddafi’s sometime second in command.

Jufra is within the tribal homeland of the Aulad Suleiman to which Gaddafi’s tribe, the Gaddadfa, is in a client relationship.  The Gaddadfa is now much diminished in influence in the light of Ghadaffy’s downfall, though it is interesting to note that Gaddfi’s eldest son, Saif al Islam, has just been released from prison in Zintan. His whereabouts are still unknown and speculation is rife at the time of writing. One suggestion is that he has joined Gaddafi’s sometime General, Ali Kana, the Tuareg whose militia controls much of Libya’s south west. There is an interesting paper on the Gaddafists here.

Saif al Islam’s whereabouts are important because they may give us an indication of where support for the old Gaddafi regime is strongest. The Gaddafists are, so far, lying doggo but they oppose Haftar who they consider to be an American with his own agenda. At some time Haftar will have to deal with both the Gaddafists and with Ali Kana’s Tuareg militias. There is something about Ali Kana here.

The Zintanis are Hafter’s allies in the Jebel Nefusa some 180 kilometres south west of Tripoli. They have been preparing to move back into Tripoli for some time. They refer to themselves as the Western Command of Haftar’s Libyan National Army and are well armed and thirsting for revenge having been beaten out of Tripoli in the summer of 2014 by the Misuratan lead forces. They have broken up the Abubakr Al-Siddiq brigade which released Saif al Islam and Haftar can still count on their support.

Misurata, Libya’s third largest city some 210 kilometres east of Tripoli, is in the process of change. The municipal council is beginning to assert itself against the powerful Islamist militias which have dominated the city for some considerable time. The militias are, however, still well armed and Hafter would be wise to outflank them were he to intend to dominate Tripoli. It is perhaps this consideration which has influenced his strategy.

He has indicted that his next step is to move some 300 kilometres north east into Beni Walid. This is particularly interesting. Beni Walid is the stronghold of the Warfella tribe and was one of the last pro-Gaddafi centres to surrender during the 2011 civil war. The Warfella, one Western Libya’s Sa’adi tribes, is also said to be one of Libya’s largest and was greatly favoured by Gaddafi for much of his reign. There are reports that Haftar has already met Warfella leaders to discuss future operations. There are still, it is said, a number of Gaddfists in Beni Walid. Which horse will the Beni Walid leaders put their money on?

Should Hafter achieve a move to Beni Walid he may consider the Warfella’s western neighbour the Tarhuna tribe as the next objective on his road to Tripoli. We will see.

HAFTAR  CONSOLIDATES  HIS POSITION IN CENTRAL LIBYA

On 17^th October 2017 Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar told a meeting of his army commanders in Benghazi that the size of Libya is 1,760,000 square kilometres and the Libyan National Army which he commands controls of 1,730,000 square kilometres of it.

As expected, he has reached an agreement with the Warfella tribe based around Beni Walid. He has raised the new 27th Infantry Brigade for recruits from the Warfella under the command of Colonel Abdulla al- Warfella. It is noted that the Warfella tribe was highly favoured under the Gaddafi regime. The new regiment is scheduled to undergo as period of training but it is clear that Hafter’s sphere of influence has been extended to one of Libya’s respected tribes with wide territorial influence. (This map will serve to show the location of the Warfella tribe’s homeland in Libya).

The leadership of the Warfella tribe under Sheikh Mohamad al-Barghouti has been notably withdrawn from the damaging armed discord which has bedevilled Libya since the downfall of the Gaddafi regime. A good piece about this by a noted Libyan journalist can be found here.

However, the tribe has long been at odds with the Misuratans who conducted a siege of Beni Walid in 2012 on the pretext of flushing out Gaddafists who were said to have been afforded refuge there. The story of the siege and something of the history of the enmity between the Warfella and the Misuratans may be found here.

What the Field Marshall did not say on 17th October, but his commanders will know,  that he has not reached an accommodation with the militias of Libya’s third largest city, Misurata, where a number of powerful, well trained and battle-hardened militias are ranged against him. It is hard to see how he intends to deal with the considerable challenge they pose.

Nor does he appear to have referred to the Tuareg militias in the south west of the country though, no doubt, he has entered into discussions with their leaders.

Some observers believe he is preparing to enter Tripoli soon. He will have a number of tactical problems to overcome. There are some strong but warring militias in Tripoli which will not take readily to the loss of power they now exercise. They may put aside their differences and oppose him. He will not wish to confront them in built up areas and cause collateral damage. However, he may be negotiating with people within the city in order to eliminate, or at least reduce, armed opposition. He may use the fact that a large proportion of Tripoli’s civil population is heartily fed up with the constant armed battles between militias and the shortages of fuel and electricity. For example, the people of Tripoli have recently sufferd sever water shortages because the flow of water from the sub Saharan aquifers in the Jebel Hasouna has been interrupted by an armed gang which attacked the electricity control room supplying the pumps.

He will need to block the Misuratan militias who would, no doubt, attempt a flank attack on his forces.He will clearly wish to delay his confrontation with them until he has separated the Islamist/Jihadist militias from the moderates.  He can afford to wait but not too long. IS is has retained a foothold in Libya but has been attacked recently by US drones. With the fall of its Syrian bases it will be tempted to set up in a divided Libya.

MORE NOTES ON HAFTAR’S PROGRESS – 29^th OCTOBER 2017

Haftar’s communication chief, Colonel Ahmed Mismari, has stated that the Libyan National Army, is now preparing to go to Tripoli where it would be welcome by the people. He told the press that the ‘LNA’s new operational area was West Libya’, that is the old Province of Tripolitania, and preparations were now in hand for the ‘next phase’ of what he called the ‘decisive battle for the Libyan Army’. He implied that Haftar had given the politicians attempting to bring some form of stable and effective government into being six months to do so before the LNA moves to take over. It will be interesting to follow this battle as it develops. In the meantime, there follows some speculative notes on allies and enemies which will need the attention of Haftar’s planners.

Were Hafter and his Libyan National Army to intend to move towards Tripoli he would likely be joined by his allies from Zintan in the Jebel Nefusa to the south west of the city. To that end he has trained a considerable number on new recruits to augment the battle hardened Zintani militias. He may already have sounded out, and would likely receive support from, the Warishifana tribe whose territory dominates Tripoli’s western approaches. It will be interesting to see how his plans are developing in this direction.

For the moment he has clearly allied himself to the Warfella tribe. He is thus in a strong position to the south east of Tripoli but, as discussed above, threatened by the Misratan militias. However, between the Warfella and the city lies the Tarhuna tribe. (This map may be useful for locating the tribal homelands.)

No doubt his intelligence people have made a thorough assessment of the Tarhuna tribal leadership and its likely allegiances. From the observer’s standpoint the outstanding problem is the Kani militia which dominates the tribe and has the Tarhuna town council in its pocket. The Kani militia claims to be Islamist but there are some who observe its operations with scepticism and suggest it has a record of revenge killings and involvement in shady trading. It does seem to be unscrupulous in practice. Haftar’s people will have noted that the Kani militia was allied to the Misuratan militias in Operation Libyan Dawn during which the Haftar’s allies, the Zintani militias, were beaten out of Tripoli and wanton destruction of aircraft and property took place at Tripoli’s international airport. An excellent paper on the battle between Haftar’s forces and those of Libya Dawn may be found here. It is the alliance between the Kani and the Misuratans which must exercise the minds of Haftar’s planners.

DERNA AND AL ABYAR– HAFTAR’S HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE?

Hafter may have concluded that he exerts military control of Eastern Libya, that is the old province of Cyrenaica. He has extended his direct influence over city and town councils and has now closed the port of Tobruk to imports other than for the direct use of the city itself. He has established a Military Authority for Investment and Public Works (MAIPW). Under its auspices he has taken control of ship bunkering at the port Benghazi and some agricultural enterprises near the oasis city of Kufra.

There is, however, one notable exception. It is the city of Derna situated about 290kms by road to the north east of Benghazi. Here he has a difficult nut to crack in the form of the city’s ruling Derna Revolutionaries’ Shura Council (DRSC), an Islamist entity which has recently removed IS from the city. It has links, I believe, with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Sharia. Some of the background to this assertion may be found above and here and here.

Haftar’s forces have Derna under siege. After the summary execution of the pilot of one of Haftar’s aircraft shot down when attacking DRSC positions the siege has been tightened and residents have been running short of food and medical supplies. Recently there has been an inaccurate bombing raid on the city which has caused collateral damage and civilian deaths. The raid has been attributed to, but denied by, Egypt. These events have drawn international condemnation which may damage Haftar. At least they may cause some hesitation on the part of the Egyptians to continue their overt support. In this context it should be noted the Egypt has intelligence which supports its view that IS is now regrouping in Libya and threatens its western frontier. The United Nations Mission in Libya has reminded Hafter “that direct or indiscriminate attacks against civilians are prohibited under international humanitarian law and reminds all parties of their obligations to protect civilians”.

Were this to be Haftar’s only hostage to fortune he may be able to contain the fallout. There is one other major issue which is likely to add weight to the growing claims that his forces have committed war crimes. The battle to clear Benghazi of Islamist/jihadists has been long and brutal. It has only recently been brought to a close and the city returned to some sort of normality. However, the bodies of 36 men which bore the signs of torture and gunshot wounds to the head have recently been found in Al-Abyar, east of Benghazi. They are said to be the bodies of militant fighters who had for so long held out against Haftar’s soldiers. The suspicion is growing that a Libya National Army field commander may have been involved in or at lest directed the killings.

This disturbing report in the British newspaper, the Guardian, sheds some light on the use of brutality and rape as a weapon of war in Libya. It contains some graphic descriptions of torture which are unpleasant to read and need further corroboration.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT ON LIBYA 2018

The Libya Herald has drawn the attention of its wide readership to the Human Rights Watch report on Libya 2018. There follows and extract from a piece by Sami Zaptia in the 19 January 2018 issue of the Libya Herald:

‘On May 18, forces aligned with the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) attacked an airbase controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA), which is affiliated with the Interim Government in eastern Libya, summarily executing 51 individuals, mostly captured fighters. On August 15, the International Criminal Court prosecutor issued an arrest warrant, its first for crimes committed since the 2011 uprising in Libya, against LNA special forces commander Mahmoud al-Werfalli, after the emergence of videos implicating him in apparent summary executions in eastern Libya. In October, the bodies of 36 men were found in the eastern town of al-Abyar, apparently executed summarily by armed groups loyal to the LNA.’’

‘‘At least 20,000 people from Benghazi remained forcibly displaced, mostly since 2014. LNA forces prevented them from returning to their homes, accusing whole families of “terrorism,” while subjecting them to abuses including seizing their private property. Armed groups from Misrata continued to collectively punish 35,000 residents of Tawergha by preventing them from returning to their homes, accusing them of war crimes in 2011, despite a UN-brokered agreement between the parties. The GNA announced on December 26, that displaced residents of Tawergha would be allowed to return to their town from February 1, 2018.’’

The full Human Rights Watch report is found here and is essential reading for all those connected to or interested in Libya.

IS HAFTER LOSING CONTROL? (Update 26/02/2018)

Hafter’s leadership is threatened by a number of factors. Has he been too slow to take Tripoli and the levers of power in Libya? This cautionary piece has appeared which briefly outlines the threats he faces.

WHERE IS KHALIFA HAFTAR?

It is Friday 13^th April 2018. In some western cultures Friday 13^th is considered unlucky. Perhaps it may be an unlucky day for Libya? Reports in the Libyan press and now in the UK broadsheet The Guardian speculate that Khalifa Haftar has suffered a stroke and is in hospital in Paris.  His spokesperson denies the reports but Haftar has yet to make a personal appearance.

This piece in Jeune Afrique dated 5^th February 2018 is a rare and useful piece by a French journalist who has met Khalifa Hafter. It can be found here.

By 24th April 2918 the rumours have gathered pace.

Reports of Field Marshal Khalifar Haftar’s death are beginning to gain in strength. He was said to have been transported to the Val-de-Grace military hospital in Paris after falling ill in Jordan. Other sources suggest that Haftar has suffered a severe and debilitating stroke which would require constant ongoing medical attention and render him unfit to rule Libya. 

This, however, appeared on the LNA Twitter account on 11th April:

‘‘All the news about General commander’s health are false, Marshal Hiftar is in excellent health and he is following his daily general command duties and all op rooms specially Omar Moktar ops room’’.

To add to the confusion the Libya Herald is reporting that some sources saying Haftar will return to Libya on 26th April 2018.

This piece in the Middle East Eye expands on Haftar’s health problems.

It is supposed that President Sisi of Egypt and leaders in the UAE are working hard to delay the official announcements of Haftar’s demise because the tensions within the Libyan National Army (LNA) which controls Eastern Libya and the Libyan oil crescent would otherwise be released with drastic consequences.

‘Because he’s so revered in eastern Libya, any potential successor to Haftar would likely face serious challenges from within the LNA, and his death could trigger deep internal conflict’ according to Sarah Al Shaalan, a Middle East and North Africa researcher at risk consultancy Eurasia Group.

Some observers are suggesting that one of Haftar’s two sons may take over but there are a number of local factions which might assert a claim.

One of Haftar’s son’s commands 106 Brigade of the LNA which appears to have been in control of Benghazi. It is reported to have commenced to move by night to Libya’s oil crescent. That would make sense in the light of the rising alarm.  The possibility that Masurian forces may take the opportunity to move on the oil facilities around the Gulf of Sirte must exercise the minds of LNA leaders. Other opportunists in the area may take advantage of a lack of resolve amongst Haftar’s petroleum facilities guards.

The LNA Special Forces commander, Wanis Bukhamada, has been reassigned to Derna. He has not always seen eye to eye with Haftar. He may be amongst those who make a bid for power.

Haftar’s very powerful Chief of Staff, Abdul Razzaq Al-Nadhuri, is head of the Benghazi Joint Security Room (BJSR). He has just recently survived a car bomb attack.

The possible tensions between Bukhamada and Al-Nadhuri are worth watching.

This piece by a noted Libyan academic is the best analysis of the situation to date. It is especially good on the tribal support for Haftar.

In the south where unrest in Sebha between the Tebu and the Awlad Sulieman tribe is endemic, the Haftar loyalist, Brigadier Khalifa Abdulhafeed Khalifa Omar, has been appointed to replace Brigadier Ihmied Mohammed Salim Al Ataibi in command of the 6^th Infantry Brigade following the latter’s breakaway declaration.  

In the west the position of the powerful Zintanis will be watched with interest. 

HAFTAR RETURNS TO LIBYA

On 26th April Field Marshal Khalifa Hafter arrived at Benina Airport in Libya to be greeted by senior officers of the LNA and notable tribesmen of the region. He gave a short address but failed to speak about his health or explain his recent absence from Libya and public life,

It is now clear that on his way home Hafter had stopped off in Cairo for talks about the problem posed by the Islamist extremists still in control of the City of Derna.   Hafter’s forces have thrown a cordon around the city but need to allow  the ordinary citizens medical supplies and sustenance. This is a particularly nut to crack and Egypt is alive to the threat the Derna Islamists pose to their western border and their national security as a whole. They recognise that Islamist training camps in Derna prepare terrorists to penetrate Egypt and create instability. No doubt Hafter was able to call on Egyptian assistance in the forthcoming battle to liberate Derna.

HAFTAR CAUGHT OFF GUARD?

Haftar takes his eye off his western flank and his old enemy Ibrahim Jadhran takes advantage and seizes the oil terminals at Ras Lanuf and Sidra on Thursday 14^th June 2018. Jadhran appears to have attacked both oil ports and may have been supported by the Islamist ‘Benghazi Defence Brigade’ and an armed group variously described as a Tebu or Chadian rebel militia. I have written about Ibrahim Jadhran here.

Hafter may have reduced his defences around Ras Launf and Sidra in order to stiffen his forces surrounding Derna where he is taking decisive action against the Islamists who have been dominating the city. My early piece in the Islamists in Derna can be found here. Hafter’s local commanders claim to have liberated more that seventy five percent the city by now and expect drive out the remaining Islamists within days.

The Libya Herald has a report on Jadhran’s attack on the oil ports here. The Libya Observer’s report can be found here. Oil industry reports suggest that the tanker Minerva has been diverted in view of the Libyan National Oil Corporation’s declaration of force majeure. This map shows where Ras Lanuf and Sidra are located.

Ashraq Al-Awsat has this report on events in Derna and Ras Lanuf today -18^th June 2018

CRUDE OIL EXPORTS REDUCED

The fall in Libya’s crude oil exports because of Jhadran’s attack and the subsequent damage to the storage capacity at Ras Lanuf is becoming critical.  Since the civil war began in 2011 eight of the original thirteen tanks have been destroyed. Jhadran’s attack has resulted in damage to two more. Libya’s National Oil Corporation has pointed out that it ‘will result in the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in construction costs, and billions in lost sales opportunities. Rebuilding the tanks may take years, especially in current security circumstances’.

HAFTAR’S FORCES RETAKE RAS LAUNUF AND EL SIDRA

Today 21st June 2018 Ashraq Al-Awsat reports;

‘The Libyan National Army said on Thursday it had rapidly retaken the shuttered key oil export terminals of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, where the head of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) said he hoped operations would resume in a “couple of days”.

Staff were evacuated from the key terminals in Libya’s eastern oil crescent and exports were suspended last Thursday when armed fighters led by Ibrahim Jathran attacked the ports and occupied them.

The closure has led to daily production losses of up to 450,000 barrels per day (bpd), and two oil storage tanks were destroyed or badly damaged by fires during the fighting.

For the past week, Khalifa Haftar’s LNA has been pounding the area with air strikes as it mobilized to retake the ports, and it continued to target its rivals with air strikes on Thursday as they retreated.’

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THE ISLAMIC STATE IN LIBYA – THE CAMEL’S NOSE IS IN THE TENT. (Updated 27th April 2016)

Since the 11th century the nomadic and semi nomadic Bedouin tribes of Libya lived out their traditional lives on land they owned by right of conquest. They moved their tents, their animals and their goods about their homelands according to the seasons. The Libyan Desert and the Sahara are reluctant to yield food and water to those who choose to live in them. Libyan tribes, therefore, protected their water sources, their plough land, their seasonal grazing lands and their date palms. They won a frugal living from a harsh environment with which they remained in a finely balanced equilibrium. Consequently the appearance of strangers in their homelands was treated with a degree of suspicion which underlay traditional desert hospitality.
The Bedouin humour needs a practiced ear to appreciate it. You can hear it in the phrase they used when strangers overstayed their welcome amongst them. They would say, ‘The camel has got its nose in the tent’.
In the middle of the last century oil was found in abundance in Libya’s tribal lands. Tribesmen found employment in the oil industry and the old pastoral life faded. For more than 40 years Libya was ruled by the eccentric Muammar Gaddafi, a man born in a Bedouin tent near Sirte. His rule was despotic and he was removed from power in 2011. Since his demise Libya has been wracked by strife and armed discord. The seed of religious extremism, ruthlessly suppressed throughout Gaddafi’s rule, has germinated in the Arab Spring and now threatens to overwhelm Libya.
The brutal Caliphate which calls itself ‘The Islamic Sate of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’ exploded out of Syria and seized territory and minds in Iraq with bewildering speed. It has become a de facto state with much of the apparatus of statehood. It is expanding rapidly and has looked for vulnerable and profitable places into which it might expand. It clearly has a greedy eye on Egypt which it threatens from the Sinai Peninsular.
Egypt’s western neighbour, Libya, became a magnet for ISIL. It harbours rich reserves of oil. It is a very large country and thus hard to police. It has fallen into armed discord since the demise of Gaddafi. Gaddafi’s huge stockpiles of arms have been looted and the country is awash with weapons. The armed militias which fought to topple Gaddafi have remained in being and are vying for power. There are two governments which are unable to reconcile their differences and one of them, that which is based in Tripoli, has Islamist leanings. Neither government has, so far, been able to exercise control over the numerous armed militias many of which are led by militant Islamists. There is no effective national police force or judiciary. The militias have assumed both of these roles from which they enrich themselves.
In the near anarchy of Libya, the ‘Islamic State’ was guaranteed a ready source of recruits and also a sufficiency of fellow travellers in positions of power. Now it has a foothold in Derna and Behghazi and is in complete control of the coastal city of Sirte and its neighbouring town of Al-Nawfaliyah.
Sirte was Gaddafi’s home town and he poured a great deal of money into it. He was killed trying to escape from it in 2011 and the city of Sirte has been a pariah ever since. It was thus virtually outlawed and an easy target for IS. It lies between the de facto government based in Tripoli and the internationally recognised government based in the eastern city of Tobruk. These ‘governments’ as so badly at odds that they are unable to combine to root IS out of Sirte. The Islamic State is thus safe in Sirte until a government of national unity exerts sufficient force to attack and eliminate it.
I vividly recall making the journey from Tripoli to Benghazi by road in the 1960s. The Tripoli oasis ends as the road turns south east at Misrata and dives into the desert through which it continues with little let up but for the towns and oil ports for more than 650Kms until it reaches Ajdabia. It is hard to convey in a few words how daunting that desert journey was in the mid twentieth century. It may have become somewhat easier now but is clear – to me at least – how difficult it would be to mount an attack on IS in its stronghold in Sirte.
So safe does IS feel in Sirte that it is from there that it now operates ISIL’s satellite TV station Al Bayan on which it broadcasts the brutal Islamic State propaganda.
There is one other major factor which has not so far been emphasised. Sirte lies to the west of the major oil ports which are spread along the southern shore of the Gulf of Sirte. This is significant in the light of this report by Maha Sulaiman which appeared in the Libya Herald on 3rd November 2015.
‘There has been another assassination attempt in Ajdabiya. Gunmen last night attempt to kill a local imam, Salem Rahil. Several shots were fired at his car as he was leaving his home. Rahil, who is also a member of staff at the University of Benghazi’s Islamic Studies Department, was unhurt.
Ajdabiya is currently the most dangerous place in Libya in terms of assassinations and attempted assassinations, which are on the rise.
Last week, a Salfist imam was murdered when a car bomb exploded beneath his vehicle. Ten days earlier the local army intelligence chief Colonel Ataya Al-Arabi died in a hail of gunfire as he drove up to his home. The day before that there was an attempt to kill another Salafist imam in the town in a similar car bomb attack. Sheikh Mohammed Bodiam escaped serious injury but his nephew was killed.
At the beginning of October, Hassuna Al-Atawish Al-Magharbi, the commander of the LNA’s Brigade 302, which is currently fighting in Benghazi, was shot dead in the town. In September, local militiaman Nasser Al-Rugaieh and political activist Belgassem Al-Zwai were killed in separate incidents and there was an attempt to kill local journalist Usama Al-Jarred.
Almost all the attacks have been blamed on Islamic State (IS) forces or the Islamist Ajdabiya Revolutionaries’ Shoura Council.’

The Islamic State is bidding to take over Ajdabia. Why is this significant? Ajdabia is a strategic city in Libya. It lies to the east of and very close to the oil ports on the southern shores of the Gulf of Sirte. I have already pointed out in earlier blog posts that Adjdabia lies at the point where the coastal road from Tripoli around the shores of the Gulf of Sirte branches north east for Benghazi, almost due east for Tobruk and south east for Kufra. It is a hub for people trafficking from the Sudan. It is also the base of Ibrahim Jhadran who commands the Central Petroleum Facilities Guard and has the power to shut down the oil ports in the Gulf of Sirte.
It is not difficult to see what would happen if IS controls Ajdabia as well as Sirte. It would lie across the sole road access to Libya’s major oil terminals which lie between Sirte and Ajdabia at Marsa Brega, al-Sidr and Ras Lanuf. It would also command the hub of Libya’s eastern highway system. That would not be desirable. The IS camel would have its nose firmly in the Libya tent.
John Oakes
6th October 2015

Update 2^nd December 2015

This, in the British Daily Telegraph today, makes disconcerting reading:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12028246/Islamic-State-is-building-a-retreat-zone-in-Libya-with-3000-fighters-say-UN-experts.html

Update 5^th January 2915

IS has launched an attack on the Libyan oil terminal at Sidra. This from the BBC is worth noting as it has a useful map showing the various ‘power bases’ in Libya.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35220281

The Libya Herald is today carrying a report listing the names of the IS fighters killed in the attack. They are all Sudanese:

‘As with almost all other IS suicide attacks, there are no Libyans involved. All four were Sudanese. IS names them as Abu Muad Al-Ghurhani, Abu Hamam Al-Ansari, Abu Abdalla Al-Ansari and Abdulrahman Al-Mohajer.’ ……….. ‘At least two members of the Petroleum Facilities Guard were killed this morning during a two-pronged attack by IS on the Sidra and Ras Lanouf oil export terminals.

It appears that IS launched two suicide car bombers at the security gate guarding Sidra in a diversionary strike while another force of up to a dozen vehicles looped south and attacked Ras Lanouf, 32 kilometres further east. In this assault one of the storage tanks in the tank farm was set ablaze.’ From Libya Herald, Tripoli, dated 4t January 2015.

Update 6th January 2015

This by Mustafa Fetouri, a Libyan academic, makes the case for intervention:-

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/libya-danger-isis-control-syria-iraq.html#

Update 24th April 2016

This from the Libya Herald.

Tripoli, 23 April 2016:

The head of the central region Petroleum Facilities’ Guards (PFG), Ibrahim Jadhran, was injured this morning in fighting with convoy of vehicles from the so-called Islamic State. According to a PFG source, one guard was killed and, in addition to Jadhran, three others wounded. He claimed that a number of IS fighters had been killed and six of their vehicles captured.

Jadhran was not seriously wounded, the source stated and, after treatment at Ajdabiya’s Imhemed Al-Magarief Hospital, returned to the fighting.

The convoy of around 100 vehicles was spotted around dawn this morning south of Brega. PFG forces from Ajdabiya were called in and engaged them some 50 kilometres from Brega. Fighting continued until around midday.

According to the source, the convoy was not that of the IS fighters who retreated from Derna on Wednesday. With less than 40 vehicles, it was reported to have reached Sirte on Thursday.

The PGF source was unable to say where today’s convoy was heading, although with 100 vehicles it was thought to be taking part in a fresh military operation, possibly an attack on the oil facilities in Brega itself. In January, IS attacked the Sidra and Ras Lanuf export terminals and then attempted an attack on the Zuetina terminal.

Meanwhile there are separate reports of IS fighters pulling out of the village of Ben Jawad, 170 kilometres west of Brega and returning to Sirte, but these have not been confirmed.

Ben Jawad was captured by IS in January.

Update 27th April 2016

It is clear that a concerted attempt to deal with the IS lodgement in Sirte is underway as this in the Libya Herald shows:

Tripoli and Khartoum, 26 April 2016.

There are reports of the movement of two groups of Libyan National Army troops towards Sirte from the south-west and east. Meanwhile at least one Misratan brigade  has announced it is moving eastwards toward the 200 kilometre-long coastal strip controlled by IS terrorists.

An army source told this newspaper that a force of more than a thousand men had left Ghabghab, the main army base at Marj and was heading for Sirte.  It seems likely that the convoy will include some of the armoured personnel carriers and pickups delivered to Tobruk from the UAE on Saturday.

It is also being reported that the LNA commander in the west, Colonel Idris Madi, is pushing towards IS territory from the south-west. He is said to be accompanied by Colonel Mohamed Ben Nail, the commander of 241 Brigade and Colonel Ali Seedi Al-Tabawey, commander of the Tebu 25 Brigade. This unit, which fought against IS and Ansar Al-Sharia forces in Benina in Benghazilast year is based around the Sarir/Messla oil fields, the Sarir power station and the Shula oil compound.

On its social media site today Misrata’s Marsa Brigade has said that forces belonging to the city’s Military Council were concentrating before advance eastwards toward Sirte.

It is unclear if the Misratan move is being made in coordination with the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Khalifa Hafter.

It is significant that the army has named its part of the move against Sirte  “Qurdabiya 2” after a battle near Sirte at Wadi Al-Hamar (The Red Valley) fought against the Italians in 1915. This was notable for the fact that it was the only major occasion on which Libyans from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan fought side by side against the Italians,

An elder of the Magharba tribe said today on 218 TV that his people will do whatever they can to help the movement of army units from the east. Meanwhile, Petroleum Facilities  Guard commander Ibrahim Jadhran, a long-standing Hafter opponent, is understood to have agreed not to interfere with the army advance. Jadhran, who is himself from the Magharba, is believed to have sought to extend the PFG’s control over more oil fields to the south.

There has been considerable social media chatter in recent days about an impending operation against IS. A series of pictures has been posted claiming to show various units advancing.

Reports from inside Sirte this evening indicated that the town in unusually quiet and that the local radio station is broadcasting an almost constant diet of IS songs.

(https://www.google.co.uk/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=libya%20herald)

 

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