Archive for the ‘AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ Category
LIBYA – CAN FIELD MARSHALL KHALIFA HAFTER TAKE TRIPOLI? (8TH APRIL 2019) (UPDATED 8TH MAY 2019)
HAFTER SHOWS HIS HAND AND THREATENS TRIPOLI
On 29th November 2017 I wrote this. ‘[Field Marshall Khalifa] Haftar’s communication chief, Colonel Ahmed Mismari, has stated that the Libyan National Army, is now preparing to go to Tripoli where it would be welcome by the people. He told the press that the ‘LNA’s new operational area was West Libya’, that is the old Province of Tripolitania, and preparations were now in hand for the ‘next phase’ of what he called the ‘decisive battle for the Libyan Army’. He implied that Haftar had given the politicians attempting to bring some form of stable and effective government into being six months to do so before the LNA moves to take over. It will be interesting to follow this battle as it develops.
Haftar has kept his word. It is reported today – 7th April 2019 – that Hafter’s advanced forces are threatening Tripoli. They are said to have taken Gharian in the foothills of the Jebel Nefusa and some further reports today suggest his forward patrols may have been within 27Kms of Tripoli.
The powerful militias from Misurata, his sworn enemies, are reported to be on their way to Tripoli to stop his progress. The Misuratans appear to be aided by the Italians and some reports of transport aircraft operating between Italy and Misurata are coming in. Though confirmation is needed.
Hafet has secured Witya military airfield close to the Libyan border with Tunis.
There appear to have been some firefights in the vicinity of Tripoli’s international airport.
NOTES ON HAFTER’S ATTACK ON TRIPOLI.
Dated 11th April 2019
Hafter’s forces attacking Tripoli are said to be commanded by Major General Abdul Salam al-Hassi supported by Major General Al Mabrouk al-Ghaziwi. Major General Wanis Bukhamada is leading his Saiqa Special Forces in the font line of the attack. Bukhamada’s Special Forces are a formidable unit having a great deal of experience in urban fighting during the recent battles for Benghazi and Derna. They may have benefited from the advice and training they received from French urban warfare experts.
It seems that Hafter’s mobile forces together with their commanders moved via the old trade route from Sebha in the Fezzan to Gharian in the Jebel Nefusa prior to the advance on Tripoli proper.
Italy, whose support for Hafter’s sworn enemies the Misuratan militias, appears to be opposing Hafter’s attack on Tripoli in diplomatic circles. France, on the other hand, has been supporting Hafter’s takeover of Sebha and much of the south east of Libya has thus been placed in a difficult position and has diplomatically urged both sides to stop fighting. Hafter’s forces are said to have a number of French military advisers. The Misuratans may have received ‘assistance’ from Italy. (Readers may recall that the Misuratans supported Hafter’s opponents in the battles to liberate Benghazi and Derna with supplies and military hardware.) In this context ‘The Libyan Address’ reported this today:-
‘PARIS – The Spokeswoman for the French Foreign Ministry said in an official statement that some groups and persons, classified on the United Nations sanctions list because of their terrorist acts, are involved in the fight in Tripoli against the Libyan National Army (LNA).
The Spokeswoman comments came in reference to the participation of persons classified internationally on sanctions list such as the smuggler known as Abdul Rahman al-Miladi, the commander of Al-Somoud Brigade from Misurata Salah Badi, Ibrahim Jidran and other extremists linked to Al-Qaeda such as Ziad Balaam who appeared in the battles within the forces of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA).’
Anyone with an interest in the conditions prevailing in Tripoli before Haftar’s attack would it find useful to read this well researched paper on the Tripoli militias before reaching a conclusion.
REINFORCEMENTS FOR HAFTAR’S LNA ARRIVE FROM BENI WALID
It is reported today – 12th April 2019 – that a large contingent of troops from Beni Walid has arrived to join Hafter’s forces attacking Tripoli. Beni Walid is the home of the Warfella tribe. The Warfella have long been at odds with the Misuratans. I wrote this on 29th November 2017:
‘As expected, he [Hafter] has reached an agreement with the Warfella tribe based around Beni Walid. He has raised the new 27th Infantry Brigade for recruits from the Warfella under the command of Colonel Abdulla al- Warfella. It is noted that the Warfella tribe was highly favoured under the Gaddafi regime. The new regiment is scheduled to undergo as period of training but it is clear that Hafter’s sphere of influence has been extended to one of Libya’s respected tribes with wide territorial influence. (This map will serve to show the location of the Warfella tribe’s homeland in Libya).
The leadership of the Warfella tribe under Sheikh Mohamad al-Barghouti has been notably withdrawn from the damaging armed discord which has bedevilled Libya since the downfall of the Gaddafi regime. A good piece about this by a noted Libyan journalist can be found here.
However, the tribe has long been at odds with the Misuratans who conducted a siege of Beni Walid in 2012 on the pretext of flushing out Gaddafists who were said to have been afforded refuge there. The story of the siege and something of the history of the enmity between the Warfella and the Misuratans may be found here.’
LOGISTICS – WILL RESUPPLY BE HAFTER’S ACHILLIES HEEL?
Dated 13th April 2019
Hafter has attacked Tripoli from the south. This means the supply lines from his base in Eastern Libya are very long. Some observers thought he would run out of fuel and ammunition unless he made a rapid and successful advance to take over his opponent’s logistics bases in Tripoli. His planners must have found a way to deal with the long distances and unfavourable terrain of his attenuated supply line. The coastal road from Benghazi to Tripoli is controlled by his opponents, the Misuratans, from Sirte westwards. This adds distance and rough terrain to his supply line. In order to outflank his opponents in Misurata, Hafter is forced to route his supply line from the east of Libya though the city of Hun. From road maps of Libya Hun can be seen to be a critical hub and his opponents have spotted his vulnerability here and are directing air strikes on and around the city.
I believe his forces are still (13th April 2019) fighting to take over Tripoli’s international airport – my own place of work in the mid-20th Century. Possession of this facility would allow him to build an air bridge and relieve some of his logistical problems. His planners have been notable successful in many ways. It will be interesting to find out how they handled the logistical conundrum that bedevilled the British and German armies in World War II. Or will logistics be his Achilles Heel?
Update 20th April 2019
Haftar’s opponents claimed yesterday (19th April 2019) to have pushed his forces out of the logistical base in Gharian in the Jebel Nefusa. I await confirmation of what would be a catastrophic blow to Hafter’s Libyan National Army and would seriously interrupt its resupply rout.
HAS HAFTER BEEN LET DOWN BY HIS ERSTWHILE ALLIES IN ZINTAN?
Hafter’s sometime allies, the powerful militias from the city of Zintan situated in the Jebel Nefusa, have not appeared amongst his coalition of forces on his drive to take Tripoli. It appears that the Zintani elders were in favour of joining the attack alongside Hafter but the sometime Minister of Defence, Osama Juwaily, opposed them. Juwaily is a Zintani and was a army captain during Gaddafi’s rule. He has considerable influence in Zintan, and appears to have split the city’s militias which have so far kept out of the fray.
Some experts are arguing that Hafter had banked on the Zintani militias joining the battle on his side and suggest that his advance has been fatally flawed as a result. However there had been indications of Juwaily’s alignment for some time and I suggest that Haftar was aware of his loyalties.
Update 23rd April 2019
At least two reliable sources report that Major General Idris Madi (Apparently commander of the Western Region) is leading a large force from Zintan in the Jebel Nefusa to join Hafter”s attack on Tripoli. It seems that the issues which have restrained the formidable Zintanis from joining Hafter have somehow been resolved.
Some deatailed background about the Zintani militas and the connection between Zintan and Italy can be found here:
https://jamestown.org/brief/look-commander-zintan-military-council-osama-al-juwaili/
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TRIPOLI ATTEMPTS TO ATTACK HAFTER’S EXTENDED LINES
I suspect this is the first sign of General Ali Kanna and his Tuareg militias. The pro Tripoli ‘Southern Protection Force’ attacked Tamanhint airbase near Sebha on or about the 17th April and Hafter’s forces retreated, regrouped and returned. They are said to have regained possession of the airbase. It is clear that Tripoli is endeavouring to harass Hafter. Some relevant information about Ali Kanna can be found here.
Reports of further reinforcements arriving at Hafter’s forward base in Gharian make it clear that he is able to attract support.
HAFTER’S POWERFULL INTERNATIONAL ALLIES
THE USA
Hafter has dual US and Libyan citizenship. President Trump and Hafter have recently conferred by phone. Trump expressed his support for Hafter’s drive to take Tripoli undermining at a stroke the efforts of the British and Italians to raise a UN resolution condemning the use of force in Tripoli. This has changed the game radically and tipped it in favour of Hafter.
This cautionary piece in Bloomberg dated 25th April 2019 is worth reading in this context. It suggests that there is some disagreement between President Trump and the US State Department about Hafter
FRANCE
For some time, France has been supporting Hafter. They see the threat of IS and similar Islamic extremists now embedded in Libya’s lawless south as threats to the old French Empire states of Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso thus as dangers to France. They have a considerable armed presence in the Sahel region, and they are aware that Islamist groups operating in Southern Libya draw support from allies in Tripoli. Hafter has moved to dominate Libya’s south west and will attempt to eradicate the Islamist groups. The French propose to support him.
Update 2nd April 2019:
This appeared in ‘Adress Libya’ today:-
Speaking in an exclusive interview with Le Figaro, – France’s Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian said:-
“For a long time, since the French operation Serval 2013 in Mali, we have realized that most weapons came from Libya and that many groups had back bases, starting with AQIM,” said Le Drian, using the acronym of the terror group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Remember, al-Qaeda became dominant in Benghazi, US Ambassador Chris Stevens was killed in the same city in 2012, and Daesh [aka ISIS] then infiltrated Libyan territories,” he said.“I had alerted from September 2014, in an interview with Le Figaro, on the terrorist risks and on the possibility of local implementation of Daesh. This is exactly what happened: Daesh occupied several Libyan cities and even threatened, at one time, to get its hands on the oil resources.”
“Since May 2014, LNA, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, conducted one military operation after another and successfully hunted ISIS and other terrorist groups from one city to the next. LNA first defeated the so-called Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, a militia alliance which included the group responsible for the attack that killed the U.S. ambassador, after two-month long battle in Benghazi.In October 2014, the terrorist group ISIS took control of numerous government buildings, security vehicles and local landmarks in Derna. LNA launched a military operation in 2015 which successfully liberated the city from ISIS, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.”
“LNA forces and local police began to impose security in previously lawless cities one by one until finally dominating all of Cyrenaica and securing the country’s vital oil resources.Earlier this year, LNA mobilized its forces towards the southern region of Fezzan in response to calls made by residents who suffered from the criminal acts of local militias and Chadian armed rebel groups. The residents of Fezzan quickly embraced LNA, which enabled its forces to take control of the region in less than three months.”
“LNA continues its territorial expansion with its recent operation to liberate Tripoli. In addition to France, other international powers such as the United States, Russia and China have signaled their support for LNA’s operation.”
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND SAUDI ARABIA
Both states are supporting Hafter with funds and military hardware. It has been reported that drones have been used at night by Hafter’s forces to bomb his enemies in Tripoli. Hafter’s aged Russian fighter aircraft are incapable of operating at night. Reuters is carrying reports from a number of Tripoli residents who say they heard drones circling the city for 10 minutes before opening fire. These reports, and the unusual accuracy of the attacks, are leading some experts to believe that UAE drones were used.
Update 8th May 2019
Today there are a some widely circulated reports about the drone attack on targets south of Tripoli on the night of 19/20th April. It appears that there are photographs of parts of a Blue Arrow 7 laser-guided missile amongst the target debris. This has led investigators to attribute the strike to a Chinese manufactured Wing Loong drone operated by the UAE. The UAE is known to have Wing Loong drones armed with BA 7 missiles, as have China and Kazakhstan. Egypt, according to some, also may also have Wing Loong drones armed with BA 7 missiles but corroboration is needed. The UN Security Council will view the usse of the drone and missile as a violation of the arms embargo currently imposed on Libya. An interesting piece about these weapons can be found here.
EGYPT
The Egyptian President Sisi has been a longstanding and steadfast ally of Hafter. He is aware of the influence exerted in Tripoli by the Muslim Brotherhood and it is clear that he needs a stable and sympathetic neighbour on his western border. He has enough trouble with Islamists in the Saini on his eastern border and the Sudan has not been a sympathetic neighbour in the south. I believe he has communicated his reasons for supporting Hafter to Germany’s Angela Merkel.
RUSSIA
Russia is playing its usual canny game by supporting Hafter in the UN. It is also courting Hafter’s favour with inexpensive but effective gestures and, some say, supplying Russian mercenaries to train Hafter’s military. Hafter himself trained in Russia at an early stage in his career.
HAFTER’S POWERFUL ENEMIES
QATAR
It is clear that the Al Thani family who rule Qatar has purchased considerable support in Libya. Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia are uneasy about the effect Qatar is having in Libya and in the Middle East in general. Some sources suggest that the total value of Qatari arms to militants in Libya is estimated at 750 million euros between 2011 and 2017. This long but interesting report is illuminating in this context:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/596c92b64.html
TURKEY
The Ottoman/Turkish occupation of Libya began in 1551 and ended when the Italians replaced them in 1912. The main value for the Ottomans was in the profits of the trans Saharan slave trade which was not extinguished (in Benghazi at least) until 1911. Ottoman Tripoli was also a base for Barbary Corsairs which harried merchant ships in the Mediterranean. The Turks have, therefore, an historic interest in Libya. The Islamist nature of Turkey’s present government seems to have persuaded it to conspire with Qatar against Hafter. Turkey has recently stationed a warship in close proximity to Tripoli and another close offshore Misurata. This seems like a belligerent act against Hafter.
Update 28th April 2019
A spokesperson for Hafter’ Libyan National Army made this statment on 27th April:
‘During the past week, LNA was able to arrest a number of Turkish armed elements who were fighting alongside the Tripoli militias, in a development that seems to confirm the direct involvement of the Erdoğan government in the Libyan conflict. Many of the passports of the Turkish elements were seized by LNA forces.’
Update 5th May 2019
There are some reports of the presence of a large number of Syrian made M-302 artillery missiles in the hands of militias apposing Hafter’s LNA on the approaches to Tripoli. These missiles (also referred to as the Khaibar-1 rocket about which little is known outside Syria and, some imply, Iran) were said to have been imported in April into Libya on the Iranian cargo ship Shahr E Kord through the port of Misurata. Some experts are connecting this shipment of arms with Turkey.
BACKING TWO HORSES IN A FATAL RACE ?
ITALY – ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA
Italy has been investing time and resources in courting the two powerful city states of western Libya outside the capital Tripoli. Libya’s third largest city is Misurata. Its militias fought a protracted and bloody battle against Gaddafi in 2011. The city was badly battered, and its people suffered greatly. The Misuratan militias became experienced and formidable fighting units. Since that time, they have been involved in Tripoli and were the winners of a war with the militias of the other powerful city state, Zintan, situated in the Jebel Nefusa. The Zintani militias are also battle hardened and well-armed.
Italy, the sometime colonial power in Libya, has found it expedient to court both the Misuratans and the Zintanis with military and financial support. Hafter has allied himself with the Zintani’s and probably counted on their support when he planned his attack on Tripoli. They appear to have hesitated to join his attack but are now engaged on his side. The Misuratans on the other hand are opposing Hafter.
Italy is thus on the horns of a dilemma. It is also experiencing internal political tensions and suffering from a great influx of migrants who set off to cross the Mediterranean from western Libya.
LIBYA – TRIPOLI AND THE PERILS OF URBAN WARFARE (28TH APRIL 2019)
There is something especially horrible about urban warfare today. There are a few readable papers on the subject which are worth a few moments to those who recognise that urban warfare represents one of the great shifts in how armies fight each other. They are found here and here. Here is a quote from the latter:
‘The nature of the battlefield is as complex as the enemies within it. Urban environments in particular—with dense populations, narrow streets, subterranean passages, and multi-storey buildings that serve as enemy defensive positions—pose significant challenges for mechanised infantry assault forces and have traditionally been avoided when at all possible.’
‘A multi-storied building may take up the same surface area as a small field, but each story or floor contains approximately an equal area as the ground upon which it sits. In effect, a ten-story building can have eleven times more defensible area than “bare” ground—ten floors and the roof. Buildings and other urban structures, damaged but not destroyed, can become (or remain) effective obstacles and possible booby traps.Roofs and other super surface areas may also provide excellent locations for snipers; lightweight, handheld antitank weapons; MANPADS; and communications retransmission sites. They enable top-down attacks against the weakest points of armoured vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft.’
‘Subsurface areas include subterranean areas such as subways, mines, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems, cellars, civil defence shelters, and other various underground utility systems. In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug tunnels and catacombs. Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and manoeuvre against the rear and flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes. However, these areas are often the most restrictive and easiest to defend or block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their existence and overall design Many threats will integrate widely available off-the-shelf technologies into their weapon systems and armed forces. However, sniper rifles and small, man-portable, fire-and-forget weapons and demolitions and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to include suicide and car bombs, will likely dominate the urban environment.’
As this piece is being written Hafter’s forces are attempting the fight their way from the southern suburban centers on five fronts into down town Tripoli. Reports indicate that the main battle front stretches across Ain Zara, Khalat Al-Furjan, Aziziya, Wadi Rabea and Gasr Ben Ghashir. The last, Ben Gashir, some twenty miles south of down town Tripoli, is in the vicinity of the cities long disused international airport and most of the battle front is in the Tarhuna tribal area.
The dark side of urban warfare is clearly illustrated by this extract from the report dated 26th April by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:
‘About 1,700 Internally Displaced (IDP) children have been reached with psychosocial assistance and more than 37,500 persons have now fled their homes as a result of the fighting around the borders of Tripoli. There are at least 90 civilian casualties, including 21 verified fatalities since the beginning of the conflict. These casualties include medical personnel, women and children, and at least one foreign national.
The conflict has significantly affected the capacity of hospitals and primary health centres with some medical personnel leaving the health facilities, thus hindering the capacity of the health system to respond to increasing needs. Specialized health workers are particularly needed. Armed actors and security institutions have restricted freedom of movement and increased security check toward the civilian population. IDPs who originate from Eastern Libya, the home of Hafter’s LNA, are being targeted as potential combatants or being politically allied to Hafter.’
TARHUNA – A CHANGE OF ALLEGANCE
In an attempt to predict Hafter’s plan for his advance on Tripoli I wrote this about Tarhuna on 29th October 2017. (I declare an interest in the region as one of my duties whilst serving with the British Royal Air Force in the 1960s brought me into occasional contact with a facility called the Tarhuna Range.):-
‘No doubt his intelligence people have made a thorough assessment of the Tarhuna tribal leadership and its likely allegiances. From the observer’s standpoint the outstanding problem is the Kani militia which dominates the tribe and has the Tarhuna town council in its pocket. The Kani militia claims to be Islamist but there are some who observe its operations with scepticism and suggest it has a record of revenge killings and involvement in shady trading. It does seem to be unscrupulous in practice. Haftar’s people will have noted that the Kani militia was allied to the Misuratan militias in Operation Libyan Dawn during which the Haftar’s allies, the Zintani militias, were beaten out of Tripoli and wanton destruction of aircraft and property took place at Tripoli’s international airport. An excellent paper on the battle between Haftar’s forces and those of Libya Dawn may be found here. It is the alliance between the Kani and the Misuratans which must exercise the minds of Haftar’s planners.
It was clear at the time I wrote the above that Hafter had made and alliance with the Warfella tribe based at Beni Walid. Between the Warfella and Tripoli lay the Tarhunans. Hafter would have to approach Tripoli through their tribal lands to outflank his powerful enemies in Misurata. Hafter’s luck was with him. The Kani militia attacked the Tripoli militias recently and underwent a change of heart. See here and here for some background. The Tarhunans were clearly brought into an alliance with Hafter thus opening the southern approaches to Tripoli. That must have been an interesting negotiation and may have involved a number of promises Hafter will have to honour later should he win.
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LIBYA – IS FIELD MARSHAL KHALIFA HAFTAR STRONG ENOUGH TO RULE ? (UPDATED 21st JUNE 2018)
On 18th December 2017 the British newspaper, the Times, ran a piece on Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar which opened with these words.
‘The most powerful military commander in Libya has declared the internationally recognised government redundant and suggested that he should run the country.
In a speech likely to lead to further chaos in the already fractured nation Khalifa Haftar, whose forces control most of east Libya, claimed that a 2015 UN-brokered peace deal had expired, rendering the government that emerged from it illegitimate.
In an address broadcast from his headquarters in Benghazi, General Haftar said: “All bodies resulting from this agreement automatically lose their legitimacy, which has been contested from the first day they took office.”
Acknowledging that the country was now at an “historic and dangerous turning point”, he hinted that he would consider filling the political void by running for president.’
FIELD MARSHAL KHALIFA HAFTAR LAUNCHES A BID FOR POWER
There is an intense diplomatic effort underway to settle Libya’s brutal and persistent civil war. The Egyptian President, who has much to lose if it fails, has led the charge. The Gulf States and Tunisia are playing prominent roles in the negotiations. The Gulf States were deeply involved in the hasty intervention which led to Gaddafi’s downfall but which set off a predictable and bloody civil and religious war. For some time now it has been apparent that Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and his Libyan National Army, has been gaining control over much of Eastern Libya and he can no longer be referred to as a renegade general. He is now a major, but strangely divisive, factor to be accounted for if Libya is to have a future. The opposing parties in Libya’s armed chaos are weary as are the ordinary Libyans. It is time to sort things out. There are several biographies of the Field Marshal online. The BBC carries this one on it’s news site. You may wish to read it before proceeding further.
Most of the commentary about Haftar is written from the Tripolitanian, that is Western Libyan, point of view. Tripoli is, and has long been, the major city and political hub of Libya. The UN has focused its attention there as has the EU amongst others. It seems to me that there are few commentators writing today with experience of living in Eastern Libya. Perhaps you will permit me to write a piece about Haftar from a Cyrenaican perspective.
In January 2012, soon after the fall of Gaddafi, I wrote a piece for my publisher’s blog entitled ‘Is a Strongman Necessary in Libya?’ Since then Field Marshall Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, at the head of his Libyan National Army, has dominated the old province of Cyrenaica, now called Eastern Libya. He now appears to hold sway over Libya’s Oil Crescent around the southern shore of the Gulf of Sirte. In this regard, he has a strangle hold over Libya’s principle, and almost only, source of revenue.
I argue that Haftar’s military campaign to drive out militant Islamists needs the support of tribal leaders and elders. Haftar is a member of the Farjan tribe. His fellow tribesmen can be found from Sirte to Benghazi. Haftar’s brother is the leader of the Benghazi Farjani’s. Why should this matter today? It matters because tribal affiliations are still important in Libya, especially so in Cyrenaica. (This map, though complicated, will serve to show the major tribal homelands in Libya.)
There is a tribal hierarchy at the top of which sit the nine Sa’adi tribes, so called after Sa’ada of the Beni Sulaim, their ancestress. (Some sources call her Soada Al Hilaliya). The Beni Sulaim and Beni Hilal tribes migrated into Libya from the Najd in the early part of the 11th Century. The nine Sa’adi tribes hold their territory by right of conquest. Other tribes live amongst the Sa’adi tribes as clients. They are known as Marabtin tribes. The Farjan is a client tribe of a special nature, being classed as one of the Marabtin bil baraka, tribes of the blessing. They, like the Aulad al-Sheik and the Masamir, live amongst the Sa’adi tribes as equals because of their supposed descent from saints. The Sa’adi’s, however, do not regard them as ‘quite like themselves’ as they are not of Bedouin descent, their ancestor having supposedly migrated into Libya from the Maghreb.
In a civil war, and the troubles in Libya are partly that, leaders must watch their backs. In Libya losing the loyalty of leading tribes would be a folly. We may note that Gaddafi tried to maintain some semblance of order by giving senior military posts to leading personages of his favoured tribes. Haftar was recently forced to reinstate Colonel Faraj Al-Barasi after he had sacked him twice from operational posts. He was pressured into doing so by the Colonel’s own tribe, the Bara’asa, and by its allies the Darsa, the Hasa and the Obeidat. To have alienated those tribes would have meant Haftar could suffer a notable loss of support in territory stretching from just north east of his headquarters at al-Marj to the Egyptian border.
It is not without significance that much of Libya’s oil crescent is in the homeland of the al-Magharba tribe, one of the nine Sa’adi tribes. Al-Magharba territory reaches as far eastwards as Ajdabia, Haftar’s place of birth. The support of Magharba tribal elders is crucial factor in Hafter’s all important hold on the oil ports and the strategically important city of Ajdabia. He will make sure, therefore, that he maintains close and cordial relations with the leading families of the Magharba such as the Latiawish.
Haftar’s avowed aim is to rid Libya of militant Islamists. Ranged against him is Dar Al-Ifta head Sheik Sadiq al-Ghariani, Libya’s hard-line Grand Mufti. Sheik Ghariani is based in Tripoli and has his own TV station from whence he preaches recklessly throughout Libya. He appears to be unassailable and is strongly suspected of supporting Salafist-Jihadist organisation in Eastern Libya. Whilst they vary in influence I find these to be the most interesting at the time of writing.
Derna, the small city and port on the north coast of East Libya, has long been a haven for Salafist-Jihadists. Some three years ago I wrote this in a blog piece about Derna. ‘Today, barring an unforeseen accident, Derna is the lair an Islamist warlord called Sufian Ben Qumu. Ben Qumu’s ‘private’ militia amalgamated with two other radical Islamist armed groups, the Army of the Islamic State of Libya and the Derna branch of Ansar Sharia, to form the Shura Council of Islamic Youth. There are strong elements within this amalgamated group which have ties to Al Qaida. The Shura Council of Islamic Youth has gained a reputation for violence and militancy. It has carried out at least two public executions in Derna which have been condemned by Amnesty International’
Since I wrote the above Derna has had the doubtful pleasure of a period of Islamic State rule. The IS folk were evicted and the city is now ruled by the Shura Council of Muhajadeen in Derna. I suggest it is likely that this organisation has evolved from the Shura Council of Islamic Youth and has strong connections with Ansar Sharia and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Derna is geographically isolated and I suspect the Haftar has it well contained and will try to deal with it later, avoiding collateral damage as far as possible. He cannot leave the problem unresolved much longer.
Notable in this regard are the reports coming from inside Libya that the Egyptian Air Force has made two bombing raids on Islamist strongholds in Derna recently. The last was on the morning of the 29th May. The raids were made in conjunction with Haftar’s Libyan National Army and aimed at strategically important points controlled by Derna’s Mujahadeen Shura Council. The Egyptians had been exasperated by murderous attacks on their Coptic Churches which, they believe, were carried out by terrorists based or trained near Derna. Egypt has now shown its support for Haftar in no uncertain terms
Haftar’s three year long campaign to remove Islamist-Jihadist forces from Benghazi has been successful. It has been protracted because of the nature of guerrilla warfare in cities.Those interested in what is a relatively modern military problem will find this paper worth reading. It has also been hampered by Haftar’s lack of a navy thus allowing reinforcements and supplies to reach the militants from Misrata, across the Gulf of Sirte. Benghazi now has a relatively stable municipal government led by its acting mayor, Abdelrahmen el-Abbar. The Abbar family is prominent in the Awaquir tribe. The Awaquir is one of the nine Sa’adi tribes and its homeland surrounds Benghazi. Hafter must be concerned that pockets of militants remain in Benghazi’s Sabri and Suq al-Hout districts. His Libyan National Army spearheaded by experienced special force launched an attack on militants in these two districts on 8th May 2017.
Particularly interesting now is the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. In my view this body has Ansar Sharia as its mainstay and is likely to be allied to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is its connection with the Benghazi Defence Brigades which must trouble Haftar. They were formed under the banner of Sheik Sadiq Ghariani and appear to be based in or near Misrata. This unit was strong enough to take Haftar’s forces unawares and evict them briefly from the important Oil Crescent facilities of Ben Jawad and Nuflia. It is also supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and thus by ‘political Islam’.
Is Khalifa Haftar strong enough to rule Libya? He has repeatedly stated that he does not wish to do so. Should he attempt to do so he may not receive sufficient international support. I have drawn attention to only some of those who pose a danger to him in his own back yard. There are many more obstacles in the way of a settlement in Libya. However, Haftar must be counted amongst those who may achieve a solution. Of note is the spate of ambassadors who have visited him in recent weeks. They are Ambassadors Peter Millet of the UK, Brigitte Curmi of France, Guiseppe Perrone of Italy and Eric Strating of Holland. The UN Special Envoy to Libya, Martin Kobler, also visited recently. It is my view that Haftar will not have compromised on his clear and determined claim to the command of all Libya’s armed forces. We will see how all this works out soon.
WHAT WILL FIELD MARSHAL KHALIFA HAFTAR DO NEXT? (Further notes added 13th June 2017)
Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces are now in possession of the Brak Al-Shatti and Jufra airbases in Southern and Central Libya. Effectively they took them from the Misuratan based 13th Brigade and Mustafa Al-Sharksi’s Benghazi Defence Brigade which had deployed ruthless tactics. The 13th Brigade is said to have withdrawn to its base in Misurata and the Benghazi Defence Brigade to Sabratha to the west of Tripoli.
Once Haftar’s advance troops have made the airfields safe, cleared their approaches and organised the logistics, he will be able to position his warplanes within striking distance of Misurata and Tripoli. He can also use his transport aircraft to ferry in material and reinforcements to build up a strong foothold in Central Libya. This shifts his strategic outlook considerably but it gives Haftar a new set of political and tribal considerations peculiar to the South and West of the country.
Let us look at it now from the tribal point of view. Brak al-Shati is in the territory of the Magarha tribe to which belonged Abdulbaset al-Magrahi, the convicted Lockerby bomber. Notable amongst the tribe’s sons is Abdulla Senussi, Gaddafi’s brother in law and intelligence supremo and Major Abdessalam Jalloud, Gaddafi’s sometime second in command.
Jufra is within the tribal homeland of the Aulad Suleiman to which Gaddafi’s tribe, the Gaddadfa, is in a client relationship. The Gaddadfa is now much diminished in influence in the light of Ghadaffy’s downfall, though it is interesting to note that Gaddfi’s eldest son, Saif al Islam, has just been released from prison in Zintan. His whereabouts are still unknown and speculation is rife at the time of writing. One suggestion is that he has joined Gaddafi’s sometime General, Ali Kana, the Tuareg whose militia controls much of Libya’s south west. There is an interesting paper on the Gaddafists here.
Saif al Islam’s whereabouts are important because they may give us an indication of where support for the old Gaddafi regime is strongest. The Gaddafists are, so far, lying doggo but they oppose Haftar who they consider to be an American with his own agenda. At some time Haftar will have to deal with both the Gaddafists and with Ali Kana’s Tuareg militias. There is something about Ali Kana here.
The Zintanis are Hafter’s allies in the Jebel Nefusa some 180 kilometres south west of Tripoli. They have been preparing to move back into Tripoli for some time. They refer to themselves as the Western Command of Haftar’s Libyan National Army and are well armed and thirsting for revenge having been beaten out of Tripoli in the summer of 2014 by the Misuratan lead forces. They have broken up the Abubakr Al-Siddiq brigade which released Saif al Islam and Haftar can still count on their support.
Misurata, Libya’s third largest city some 210 kilometres east of Tripoli, is in the process of change. The municipal council is beginning to assert itself against the powerful Islamist militias which have dominated the city for some considerable time. The militias are, however, still well armed and Hafter would be wise to outflank them were he to intend to dominate Tripoli. It is perhaps this consideration which has influenced his strategy.
He has indicted that his next step is to move some 300 kilometres north east into Beni Walid. This is particularly interesting. Beni Walid is the stronghold of the Warfella tribe and was one of the last pro-Gaddafi centres to surrender during the 2011 civil war. The Warfella, one Western Libya’s Sa’adi tribes, is also said to be one of Libya’s largest and was greatly favoured by Gaddafi for much of his reign. There are reports that Haftar has already met Warfella leaders to discuss future operations. There are still, it is said, a number of Gaddfists in Beni Walid. Which horse will the Beni Walid leaders put their money on?
Should Hafter achieve a move to Beni Walid he may consider the Warfella’s western neighbour the Tarhuna tribe as the next objective on his road to Tripoli. We will see.
HAFTAR CONSOLIDATES HIS POSITION IN CENTRAL LIBYA
On 17th October 2017 Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar told a meeting of his army commanders in Benghazi that the size of Libya is 1,760,000 square kilometres and the Libyan National Army which he commands controls of 1,730,000 square kilometres of it.
As expected, he has reached an agreement with the Warfella tribe based around Beni Walid. He has raised the new 27th Infantry Brigade for recruits from the Warfella under the command of Colonel Abdulla al- Warfella. It is noted that the Warfella tribe was highly favoured under the Gaddafi regime. The new regiment is scheduled to undergo as period of training but it is clear that Hafter’s sphere of influence has been extended to one of Libya’s respected tribes with wide territorial influence. (This map will serve to show the location of the Warfella tribe’s homeland in Libya).
The leadership of the Warfella tribe under Sheikh Mohamad al-Barghouti has been notably withdrawn from the damaging armed discord which has bedevilled Libya since the downfall of the Gaddafi regime. A good piece about this by a noted Libyan journalist can be found here.
However, the tribe has long been at odds with the Misuratans who conducted a siege of Beni Walid in 2012 on the pretext of flushing out Gaddafists who were said to have been afforded refuge there. The story of the siege and something of the history of the enmity between the Warfella and the Misuratans may be found here.
What the Field Marshall did not say on 17th October, but his commanders will know, that he has not reached an accommodation with the militias of Libya’s third largest city, Misurata, where a number of powerful, well trained and battle-hardened militias are ranged against him. It is hard to see how he intends to deal with the considerable challenge they pose.
Nor does he appear to have referred to the Tuareg militias in the south west of the country though, no doubt, he has entered into discussions with their leaders.
Some observers believe he is preparing to enter Tripoli soon. He will have a number of tactical problems to overcome. There are some strong but warring militias in Tripoli which will not take readily to the loss of power they now exercise. They may put aside their differences and oppose him. He will not wish to confront them in built up areas and cause collateral damage. However, he may be negotiating with people within the city in order to eliminate, or at least reduce, armed opposition. He may use the fact that a large proportion of Tripoli’s civil population is heartily fed up with the constant armed battles between militias and the shortages of fuel and electricity. For example, the people of Tripoli have recently sufferd sever water shortages because the flow of water from the sub Saharan aquifers in the Jebel Hasouna has been interrupted by an armed gang which attacked the electricity control room supplying the pumps.
He will need to block the Misuratan militias who would, no doubt, attempt a flank attack on his forces.He will clearly wish to delay his confrontation with them until he has separated the Islamist/Jihadist militias from the moderates. He can afford to wait but not too long. IS is has retained a foothold in Libya but has been attacked recently by US drones. With the fall of its Syrian bases it will be tempted to set up in a divided Libya.
MORE NOTES ON HAFTAR’S PROGRESS – 29th OCTOBER 2017
Haftar’s communication chief, Colonel Ahmed Mismari, has stated that the Libyan National Army, is now preparing to go to Tripoli where it would be welcome by the people. He told the press that the ‘LNA’s new operational area was West Libya’, that is the old Province of Tripolitania, and preparations were now in hand for the ‘next phase’ of what he called the ‘decisive battle for the Libyan Army’. He implied that Haftar had given the politicians attempting to bring some form of stable and effective government into being six months to do so before the LNA moves to take over. It will be interesting to follow this battle as it develops. In the meantime, there follows some speculative notes on allies and enemies which will need the attention of Haftar’s planners.
Were Hafter and his Libyan National Army to intend to move towards Tripoli he would likely be joined by his allies from Zintan in the Jebel Nefusa to the south west of the city. To that end he has trained a considerable number on new recruits to augment the battle hardened Zintani militias. He may already have sounded out, and would likely receive support from, the Warishifana tribe whose territory dominates Tripoli’s western approaches. It will be interesting to see how his plans are developing in this direction.
For the moment he has clearly allied himself to the Warfella tribe. He is thus in a strong position to the south east of Tripoli but, as discussed above, threatened by the Misratan militias. However, between the Warfella and the city lies the Tarhuna tribe. (This map may be useful for locating the tribal homelands.)
No doubt his intelligence people have made a thorough assessment of the Tarhuna tribal leadership and its likely allegiances. From the observer’s standpoint the outstanding problem is the Kani militia which dominates the tribe and has the Tarhuna town council in its pocket. The Kani militia claims to be Islamist but there are some who observe its operations with scepticism and suggest it has a record of revenge killings and involvement in shady trading. It does seem to be unscrupulous in practice. Haftar’s people will have noted that the Kani militia was allied to the Misuratan militias in Operation Libyan Dawn during which the Haftar’s allies, the Zintani militias, were beaten out of Tripoli and wanton destruction of aircraft and property took place at Tripoli’s international airport. An excellent paper on the battle between Haftar’s forces and those of Libya Dawn may be found here. It is the alliance between the Kani and the Misuratans which must exercise the minds of Haftar’s planners.
DERNA AND AL ABYAR– HAFTAR’S HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE?
Hafter may have concluded that he exerts military control of Eastern Libya, that is the old province of Cyrenaica. He has extended his direct influence over city and town councils and has now closed the port of Tobruk to imports other than for the direct use of the city itself. He has established a Military Authority for Investment and Public Works (MAIPW). Under its auspices he has taken control of ship bunkering at the port Benghazi and some agricultural enterprises near the oasis city of Kufra.
There is, however, one notable exception. It is the city of Derna situated about 290kms by road to the north east of Benghazi. Here he has a difficult nut to crack in the form of the city’s ruling Derna Revolutionaries’ Shura Council (DRSC), an Islamist entity which has recently removed IS from the city. It has links, I believe, with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Sharia. Some of the background to this assertion may be found above and here and here.
Haftar’s forces have Derna under siege. After the summary execution of the pilot of one of Haftar’s aircraft shot down when attacking DRSC positions the siege has been tightened and residents have been running short of food and medical supplies. Recently there has been an inaccurate bombing raid on the city which has caused collateral damage and civilian deaths. The raid has been attributed to, but denied by, Egypt. These events have drawn international condemnation which may damage Haftar. At least they may cause some hesitation on the part of the Egyptians to continue their overt support. In this context it should be noted the Egypt has intelligence which supports its view that IS is now regrouping in Libya and threatens its western frontier. The United Nations Mission in Libya has reminded Hafter “that direct or indiscriminate attacks against civilians are prohibited under international humanitarian law and reminds all parties of their obligations to protect civilians”.
Were this to be Haftar’s only hostage to fortune he may be able to contain the fallout. There is one other major issue which is likely to add weight to the growing claims that his forces have committed war crimes. The battle to clear Benghazi of Islamist/jihadists has been long and brutal. It has only recently been brought to a close and the city returned to some sort of normality. However, the bodies of 36 men which bore the signs of torture and gunshot wounds to the head have recently been found in Al-Abyar, east of Benghazi. They are said to be the bodies of militant fighters who had for so long held out against Haftar’s soldiers. The suspicion is growing that a Libya National Army field commander may have been involved in or at lest directed the killings.
This disturbing report in the British newspaper, the Guardian, sheds some light on the use of brutality and rape as a weapon of war in Libya. It contains some graphic descriptions of torture which are unpleasant to read and need further corroboration.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT ON LIBYA 2018
The Libya Herald has drawn the attention of its wide readership to the Human Rights Watch report on Libya 2018. There follows and extract from a piece by Sami Zaptia in the 19 January 2018 issue of the Libya Herald:
‘On May 18, forces aligned with the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) attacked an airbase controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA), which is affiliated with the Interim Government in eastern Libya, summarily executing 51 individuals, mostly captured fighters. On August 15, the International Criminal Court prosecutor issued an arrest warrant, its first for crimes committed since the 2011 uprising in Libya, against LNA special forces commander Mahmoud al-Werfalli, after the emergence of videos implicating him in apparent summary executions in eastern Libya. In October, the bodies of 36 men were found in the eastern town of al-Abyar, apparently executed summarily by armed groups loyal to the LNA.’’
‘‘At least 20,000 people from Benghazi remained forcibly displaced, mostly since 2014. LNA forces prevented them from returning to their homes, accusing whole families of “terrorism,” while subjecting them to abuses including seizing their private property. Armed groups from Misrata continued to collectively punish 35,000 residents of Tawergha by preventing them from returning to their homes, accusing them of war crimes in 2011, despite a UN-brokered agreement between the parties. The GNA announced on December 26, that displaced residents of Tawergha would be allowed to return to their town from February 1, 2018.’’
The full Human Rights Watch report is found here and is essential reading for all those connected to or interested in Libya.
IS HAFTER LOSING CONTROL? (Update 26/02/2018)
Hafter’s leadership is threatened by a number of factors. Has he been too slow to take Tripoli and the levers of power in Libya? This cautionary piece has appeared which briefly outlines the threats he faces.
WHERE IS KHALIFA HAFTAR?
It is Friday 13th April 2018. In some western cultures Friday 13th is considered unlucky. Perhaps it may be an unlucky day for Libya? Reports in the Libyan press and now in the UK broadsheet The Guardian speculate that Khalifa Haftar has suffered a stroke and is in hospital in Paris. His spokesperson denies the reports but Haftar has yet to make a personal appearance.
This piece in Jeune Afrique dated 5th February 2018 is a rare and useful piece by a French journalist who has met Khalifa Hafter. It can be found here.
By 24th April 2918 the rumours have gathered pace.
Reports of Field Marshal Khalifar Haftar’s death are beginning to gain in strength. He was said to have been transported to the Val-de-Grace military hospital in Paris after falling ill in Jordan. Other sources suggest that Haftar has suffered a severe and debilitating stroke which would require constant ongoing medical attention and render him unfit to rule Libya.
This, however, appeared on the LNA Twitter account on 11th April:
‘‘All the news about General commander’s health are false, Marshal Hiftar is in excellent health and he is following his daily general command duties and all op rooms specially Omar Moktar ops room’’.
To add to the confusion the Libya Herald is reporting that some sources saying Haftar will return to Libya on 26th April 2018.
This piece in the Middle East Eye expands on Haftar’s health problems.
It is supposed that President Sisi of Egypt and leaders in the UAE are working hard to delay the official announcements of Haftar’s demise because the tensions within the Libyan National Army (LNA) which controls Eastern Libya and the Libyan oil crescent would otherwise be released with drastic consequences.
‘Because he’s so revered in eastern Libya, any potential successor to Haftar would likely face serious challenges from within the LNA, and his death could trigger deep internal conflict’ according to Sarah Al Shaalan, a Middle East and North Africa researcher at risk consultancy Eurasia Group.
Some observers are suggesting that one of Haftar’s two sons may take over but there are a number of local factions which might assert a claim.
One of Haftar’s son’s commands 106 Brigade of the LNA which appears to have been in control of Benghazi. It is reported to have commenced to move by night to Libya’s oil crescent. That would make sense in the light of the rising alarm. The possibility that Masurian forces may take the opportunity to move on the oil facilities around the Gulf of Sirte must exercise the minds of LNA leaders. Other opportunists in the area may take advantage of a lack of resolve amongst Haftar’s petroleum facilities guards.
The LNA Special Forces commander, Wanis Bukhamada, has been reassigned to Derna. He has not always seen eye to eye with Haftar. He may be amongst those who make a bid for power.
Haftar’s very powerful Chief of Staff, Abdul Razzaq Al-Nadhuri, is head of the Benghazi Joint Security Room (BJSR). He has just recently survived a car bomb attack.
The possible tensions between Bukhamada and Al-Nadhuri are worth watching.
This piece by a noted Libyan academic is the best analysis of the situation to date. It is especially good on the tribal support for Haftar.
In the south where unrest in Sebha between the Tebu and the Awlad Sulieman tribe is endemic, the Haftar loyalist, Brigadier Khalifa Abdulhafeed Khalifa Omar, has been appointed to replace Brigadier Ihmied Mohammed Salim Al Ataibi in command of the 6th Infantry Brigade following the latter’s breakaway declaration.
In the west the position of the powerful Zintanis will be watched with interest.
HAFTAR RETURNS TO LIBYA
On 26th April Field Marshal Khalifa Hafter arrived at Benina Airport in Libya to be greeted by senior officers of the LNA and notable tribesmen of the region. He gave a short address but failed to speak about his health or explain his recent absence from Libya and public life,
It is now clear that on his way home Hafter had stopped off in Cairo for talks about the problem posed by the Islamist extremists still in control of the City of Derna. Hafter’s forces have thrown a cordon around the city but need to allow the ordinary citizens medical supplies and sustenance. This is a particularly nut to crack and Egypt is alive to the threat the Derna Islamists pose to their western border and their national security as a whole. They recognise that Islamist training camps in Derna prepare terrorists to penetrate Egypt and create instability. No doubt Hafter was able to call on Egyptian assistance in the forthcoming battle to liberate Derna.
HAFTAR CAUGHT OFF GUARD?
Haftar takes his eye off his western flank and his old enemy Ibrahim Jadhran takes advantage and seizes the oil terminals at Ras Lanuf and Sidra on Thursday 14th June 2018. Jadhran appears to have attacked both oil ports and may have been supported by the Islamist ‘Benghazi Defence Brigade’ and an armed group variously described as a Tebu or Chadian rebel militia. I have written about Ibrahim Jadhran here.
Hafter may have reduced his defences around Ras Launf and Sidra in order to stiffen his forces surrounding Derna where he is taking decisive action against the Islamists who have been dominating the city. My early piece in the Islamists in Derna can be found here. Hafter’s local commanders claim to have liberated more that seventy five percent the city by now and expect drive out the remaining Islamists within days.
The Libya Herald has a report on Jadhran’s attack on the oil ports here. The Libya Observer’s report can be found here. Oil industry reports suggest that the tanker Minerva has been diverted in view of the Libyan National Oil Corporation’s declaration of force majeure. This map shows where Ras Lanuf and Sidra are located.
Ashraq Al-Awsat has this report on events in Derna and Ras Lanuf today -18th June 2018
CRUDE OIL EXPORTS REDUCED
The fall in Libya’s crude oil exports because of Jhadran’s attack and the subsequent damage to the storage capacity at Ras Lanuf is becoming critical. Since the civil war began in 2011 eight of the original thirteen tanks have been destroyed. Jhadran’s attack has resulted in damage to two more. Libya’s National Oil Corporation has pointed out that it ‘will result in the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in construction costs, and billions in lost sales opportunities. Rebuilding the tanks may take years, especially in current security circumstances’.
HAFTAR’S FORCES RETAKE RAS LAUNUF AND EL SIDRA
Today 21st June 2018 Ashraq Al-Awsat reports;
‘The Libyan National Army said on Thursday it had rapidly retaken the shuttered key oil export terminals of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, where the head of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) said he hoped operations would resume in a “couple of days”.
Staff were evacuated from the key terminals in Libya’s eastern oil crescent and exports were suspended last Thursday when armed fighters led by Ibrahim Jathran attacked the ports and occupied them.
The closure has led to daily production losses of up to 450,000 barrels per day (bpd), and two oil storage tanks were destroyed or badly damaged by fires during the fighting.
For the past week, Khalifa Haftar’s LNA has been pounding the area with air strikes as it mobilized to retake the ports, and it continued to target its rivals with air strikes on Thursday as they retreated.’
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LIBYA – DECAPITATING DEMOCRACY
On 2nd August 2014 I wrote this in a post called ‘Can Libya’s neighbours remain on the sidelines much longer? ‘Libya is in a parlous state and her neighbours and allies are deeply concerned for the stability of the region. The insipient civil war is leading to fears that a connection between Libyan Islamists and ISIS in Iraq, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria is a likely and undesirable outcome.
Awful events in Sirte have tested the patience of Libya’s neighbour, Egypt, beyond braking point and should evoke a wider international response. The 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians held by supporters of the Islamic State in Sirte are believed to have been murdered by their captors. A video has been released which shows a number of men wearing orange execution suits being killed on a beach and their heads cut off. Sirte, the city close to which Muammar Ghaddafi was born, is situated in central Libya where the Gulf of Sirte meets the desert. It is now said to be dominated by ISIS.
Reuters reports today [16th February 2015] that Egypt’s air force bombed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) targets inside Libya [in Derna] on Monday, a day after the group released a video showed the beheading of 21 Egyptians there, marking an escalation in Cairo’s battle against militants. It was the first time Egypt confirmed launching air strikes against the group in neighbouring Libya, showing President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi is ready to expand his fight against Islamist militancy beyond Egypt’s borders. Egypt said the dawn strike, in which Libya’s air force also participated, hit ISIS camps, training sites and weapons storage areas in Libya, where civil conflict has plunged the country into near anarchy and created havens for militia.
A Libyan air force commander said between 40 to 50 militants were killed in the attack. “There are casualties among individuals, ammunition and the [ISIS] communication centres,” Saqer Al-Joroushi told Egyptian state television. “More air strikes will be carried out today and tomorrow in coordination with Egypt,” he said. The 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians, who had gone to Libya in search of work, were marched to a beach, forced to kneel and then beheaded on video, which was broadcast via a website that supports ISIS. Before the killings, one of the militants stood with a knife in his hand and said: “Safety for you crusaders is something you can only wish for.”
Reuters also reports; ‘Egypt is worried about the rise of Islamic State, especially in areas near its border. It called on Monday for the U.S.-led coalition that has been bombing Islamic State in Syria and Iraq to confront the group in Libya as well.’
The Libya Herald, in a report dated 16th February, states; ‘This morning’s Egyptian airstrikes against the Islamic State (IS) in Derna hit targets mainly outside the town, the Libya Herald has been told. These included military camps to the south and southeast set up during the Qaddafi regime but now used by IS. Other targets are reported as Ansar al-Sharia’s headquarters in the Bomsafr forest between Derna and Ain Mara, the Abu Salim brigade headquarters and the Jebel Company buildings serving as the IS headquarters and ammunitions store. The one exception appears to have the targeting of the home in central Derna’s Bab Al-Shiha area of Bashar Al-Drissi, one of the IS leaders. There were reports he had been killed two months ago but it is now said that he was injured in today’s action and taken to hospital.’
On 4th November 2014 I wrote this in a post entitled ‘The Islamic Caliphate of Eastern Libya and its Implications’ ; Those who advocate dialogue with the Islamic extremists may find little enthusiasm for their position in Libya’s eastern neighbour, Egypt, which is fighting a bloody war in Siani. According to Egyptian government figures, more than 500 people, most of them military and security forces personnel, have been killed across Egypt in militant attacks in the past year. The extreme Islamist group Ansar Bayt al Maqdes has claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. Ansar Bayt al Maqdes may hope to establish a Provence of the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula. Should this happen Egypt would be threatened by IS/ISIS on its eastern and western flanks.
In a particularly bloody attack Bayt al Maqdes militants detonated a truck bomb in Sinai at the Karm al-Qawadees military checkpoint Oct. 24, killing 30 military personnel and wounding 27. Karm al Qawadees is near northern Sinai’s biggest town, el-Arish, and not far from Egypt’s border with the Gaza Strip. Another three soldiers were killed in a fire-fight hours after the initial explosion. Egyptian sources have said that initial investigations of the Sinai massacre have thrown up the unwelcome news that a number of the terrorists are undergoing training in eastern Libya. It is also being claimed that the weapons and munitions used in the attack bore Libyan serial numbers. It would not be too difficult to see these attacks in the Sinai as an attempt to destabilise Egypt.’
Reports from Libya today [16th February] suggest that a growing number of Egyptian nationals have been kidnaped in some sort of reprisal for the air strikes
Libya’s hopes of a democratic future may have been beheaded along with 21 Coptic Christians by ISIS in Sirte.
John Oakes
16th February 2015
Some further thoughts on the implications of the Sirte massacre:-
Speaking at Kings College London on 16th February 2015, Sir John Sawers, sometime head of MI6, suggested Britain should consider putting troops on the ground in the wake of the beheading of 21 Coptic Christians by ISIL. He said that Britain needs to hold a debate on whether it is better to intervene, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to “pull back” from international intervention. Both approaches, he said, carry “huge risks”.
Another view is expressed by Deborah K. Jones, US ambassador to Libya when she says in her ’17th February address:-‘It is time for Libyans to realize that only they can build a new Libya; only they can save their country. Those who continue to fight, those who refuse to engage in dialogue, must be sanctioned by the international community – and we are prepared to do that.’
It is clear that the UK and the US have no appetite, at the moment anyway, for committing ground troops to deal with the ISIS crisis. However, there appears to be a full blown ‘four front’ war in prospect in which Boko Haram threatens to destabilize Nigeria and is encroaching on Chad, the Houthis crisis in the Yemen is escalating and is hardly noticed outside the Middle East, the Libyan debacle adds a foothold for ISIS on the Mediterranean shore and ISIS in the Levant threatens Lebanon. Egypt is at the focal point of all these conflicts and the recent reduction in US aid for its military is significant.
John Oakes
17th February 2015
Update 18th February 2013
A warning of the threat to Europe posed by IS in Libya
Update 20th February 2015
Was Egypt too quick to respond? This is a thoughtful opinion piece by a notable writer on Middle East affairs.
http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341627/opinion-sisis-if-only-moment
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LIBYA – CAN LIBYA’S NEIGHBOURS REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES MUCH LONGER?
Cairo’s Asharq Al-Awsat dated 4th August states ‘Veteran Egyptian politician and former Arab League chief, Amr Moussa, called for a public debate in Egypt on the possibility of using military force against Islamist extremists in Libya on Sunday. Moussa issued a statement over the weekend saying that Egypt’s “right to self-defence” against extremists in Benghazi and eastern Libya should be considered, as the situation in the country was a cause of great concern for Egypt and other neighbouring states’.
Libya is in a parlous state and her neighbours and allies are deeply concerned for the stability of the region. The insipient civil war is leading to fears that a connection between Libyan Islamists and ISIS in Iraq, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria is a likely and undesirable outcome. Here are some short notes on the state of play as of 2nd August 2014.
IN LIBYA
Tobruk
A large majority of the newly elected House of Representatives has arrived in the city. (Notably absent are the Representatives from Misrata). The House intends to meet on Monday for the first time in the Dar es Salaam Hotel despite the efforts of a rump of the now discredited General National Congress to deny it legitimacy. The Libya Prime Minister is present with some of his cabinet as is the Army Chief of Staff.
Derna
The city is in the hands of the Islamist Ansar Sharia militia and its allies who have declared that it is now an Islamic Emirate. It was impossible to hold elections for the Libyan House of Representatives in the city which is now out of control. Ansar Sharia and its allies have been receiving weapons by sea from Misrata.
Benghazi
The battle for Benghazi, Operation Dignity, has taken an alarming turn. The Libyan Army’s Special Forces operating against the Islamists under the overall command of Major General Hafter have been forced to abandon Camp Thunderbolt in Benghazi and are in tactical retreat from the city. It is reported today as being at Benina Airport. The leaders of Ansar Sharia and its allies have posed in triumph at the gates of Camp Thunderbolt and declared that the city is now an Islamic Emirate. However, a large demonstration of citizens gathered in the city after Friday morning prayers demanding the removal of Ansar Sharia and Libya Shield militias and the return of law and order.
Operation Dignity has taken a drubbing. Its leader, Major General Khalifa Hafter, is consistently called a renegade by the media and also by some expert western observers. Since I am neither of the media nor likely to be an expert I risk a considerable drubbing myself from some quarters when I suggest that Hafter is not a renegade. He might well be arrogant and smell a little of the CIA but it is clearly time for Libya’s government to decide what to do about him. At the moment he looks like the only man courageous enough to face down the Islamists. There are unsubstantiated rumours of a rift between Hafter and his top commanders.
Efforts during the past few days by a Council of Tribal Elders may have arranged a truce but there were explosions in the city this morning.
Misrata
This is Libya’s third largest city and it was badly mauled during the 2011 ‘ousting’ of Gaddafi. It has established itself as a near autonomous city state and Islamist powerhouse. The Misratan Union of Revolutionaries oversees some 200 militias and has 800 tanks and more than 2,000 ‘Technicals’ at its disposal. It has despatched its forces to Tripoli and is attempting to limit, or suppress, the power of the elected House of Representatives. Its own elected Representatives are notably absent from todays gathering in Tobruk.
Tripoli
Tripoli is in the grips of a war between Islamist leaning Libya Shield Central forces from the city of Misrata and two major Zintani militias loosely associated with Operation Dignity. The Zintanis in Tripoli comprises the Al Quaaqa Brigade and the Al Sawaiq Brigade both of which recruit men who come mainly from Tripoli who have connections with Zintan and the Jebel Nefusa in Libya’s south west. It is noted here that the Zintan Military Council oversees around 23 militias from the western mountains.
Battle has raged for some days around Tripoli’s International Airport. The key air traffic control unit has been destroyed and an Airbus damaged beyond repair. Tanks in the Brega oil storage depot on the road from Tripoli to the airport have been set alight.
The near total breakdown of security has forced embassies to close. The British ambassador left for Tunis today. Only and Italian and Maltese diplomatic staff remain in post as of today.
Amidst the chaos in Tripoli Sami Zaptia has just written this for the Libya Herald: ‘Both the outgoing GNC and the Caretaker government of Abdullah Thinni seem impotent to do anything to stop the paralysis, terror and destruction of Tripoli which continues to suffer rotational electricity cuts leading to internet cuts, as well as cooking gas and petrol and diesel shortages’.
Kufra
An interesting alliance between old enemies, the Arab Sway tribe and the Tebu, has been formed recently and they may join forces on the side of Khalifa Hafter against the Islamists.
LIBYA’S NEIGHBOURS
Tunisia
One side effect is that the Tunisians have been inundated by some 5,000 to 6,000 refugees per day fleeing the warfare, most of whom are Libyans but there are a number of Egyptians and Tunisians amongst them. The Tunisian government protests that it cannot cope much longer with the refugee crisis and has today closed its border with Libya.
In addition – according to the International Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Report No. 148 – ‘the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and of the Libyan war has provoked a reorganisation of contraband cartels (commercial at the Algerian border, tribal at the Libyan border), thereby weakening state control and paving the way for far more dangerous types of trafficking.
Added to the mix is the fact that criminality and radical Islamism gradually are intermingling in the suburbs of major cities and in poor peripheral villages. Over time, the emergence of a so-called islamo-gangsterism could contribute to the rise of groups blending jihadism and organised crime within contraband networks operating at the borders – or, worse, to active cooperation between cartels and jihadis’.
Egypt
Arms and drug smuggling across the southern border between Libya and Egypt has accelerated and is difficult to control. The slim possibility that the Misratans may have captured aircraft from Tripoli International Airport which they indent to use as suicide weapons against Egypt was apparently mooted in Cairo and Egypt’s air traffic controllers have been put on alert for aircraft entering their airspace without flight plans. This is an unlikely outcome but the Egyptian reaction demonstrates the raised level of anxiety amongst Libya’s neighbours.
The Egyptians are fighting Islamic militates in Sinai which, they fear, will make common cause with Libyan Islamists should the latter gain the upper hand. It is noted the Muslim Brotherhood is designated a terrorist group in Egypt. The presence of Jihadists in Libya is, therefore, alarming the Egyptian security services.
Algeria
There are strong indications that the sometime Al Qaeda ‘Emir of the Sahel’, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has moved his headquarters into lawless southern Libya near the Algerian border. He is a notorious smuggler, arms trafficker, hostage taker and opportunistic Islamist. He is a Chaamba Arab and has mounted high profile attacks on petroleum installations in Algeria.
Mali
Mali is troubled with a potential breakaway Tuareg state in it’s arid north. The unrest is a magnet for Al Qaeda and instability in neighbouring Libya exacerbates the problem, not least because of the flow of illegal arms from Gaddafi’s huge stockpiles.
Niger
Niger’s long borders with Libya are porous and dangerous. The Tebu militias are the only control in the region and they are likely to be engaged in subsistence smuggling. The presence of Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Libya is disturbing the government of Niger. He led an attack on Niger’s uranium mining facilities recently.
Nigeria and Kenya
Both are troubled by Islamists; Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Kenya. Should Libya become an Islamist Emirate both countries would see an increase in terrorism which would find ready support and shelter there.
The African Union
The AU has expressed its unease to the Libyans. The Islamist threat to sub Saharan Africa is growing. Drug, arms and people smuggling is facilitated by Libya’s anarchy and consequent lack of control over vast regions of the Sahara and the Libyan Desert.
John Oakes
2nd August 2014
UPDATE 4th August 2014
Even now the rump of Libya’s General National Congress is attempting to deprive the newly formed House of Representatives of its legitimacy by insisting that the handover of powers is to be in Tripoli. Representatives are gathered 1,000 kilometres away in the eastern city of Tobruk for their inaugural meeting today. The near total breakdown of security in Libya has rendered travel by air very difficult indeed. Many Representatives have travelled to Tobruk by road. I have driven from Tripoli to Tobruk and it was not easy, especially in August.
What lies behind this brinkmanship? Is it so that the Islamist can claim the House of Representatives has no legal powers to legislate if there is no handover ceremony? Is the outgoing head of the GNC playing for time so that the Islamist militias can consolidate their grip on the main cities? Whatever the reason it poses great dangers for Libya and the region.
The GNC has hitherto claimed that it, and not the Prime Minister, is in command of the Libya armed forces. In this way it can claim that the Islamist militias are legitimate member of Libya’s armed forces. The Chief of Staff is in Tobruk at the moment. What advice will he give to the House of Representatives? It looks like showdown time.
Update 4th August 2014
The latest news is the GNC has recognised its own demise and ceded power to the House of Representatives without a ‘hand over’ ceremony.
Update 5th August 2014
This has just appeared in the Libya Herald. Note that the Justice and Construction Party is the ‘political arm’ of the Muslim Brotherhood.
‘The political department of the Justice and Construction Party has likewise said in a statement that because it had not received power at a ceremony organised to occur yesterday in the capital, the House of Representatives did not have the authority to operate.’
Follow events from the GNC point of view……www.facebook.com/LibyanGNC
John Oakes
4th August 2014
For books by John Oakes see… (USA): http://www.amazon.com/John-Oakes/e/B001K86D3O/ref=ntt_athr_dp_pel_1 ….. (UK): http://www.amazon.co.uk/John-Oakes/e/B001K86D3O/ref=ntt_athr_dp_pel_pop_1
Update 3rd August 2014
A good survey of the opposing forces within Libya;
http://www.aawsat.net/2014/08/article55334952
Update 8th August 2104
This piece by a prestigious journalist argues for Egyptian intervention in Libya;
Update 18th August 2014
From The Libya Herald today
‘In a dramatic overnight development in the conflict in Tripoli between Misrata-led Operation Libya Dawn forces and those from Zintan, the Warshefana and their allies, positions held by the former at Mitiga Airbase and Wadi Rabia have been bombed. The government has confirmed the attack, noting in a statement that two “unidentified” aircraft had been involved……..This afternoon [Air Force Brigadier-General Saqr Adam Geroushi, the commander of Operation Dignity’s Air Force] told the Libya Herald that a Sukhoi 24, under his control but provided by a foreign air force, which he would not name, had been in action in Tripoli “to protect civilians”.’
I note that the Algerian Air Force has 34 SU-24MKs. Algeria has been contemplating intervention in Libya since May this year. The Algerian military establishment has been in favour of intervention but the politicians have been cautious.
Update 19th August 2014
One of the bombs used with precision in the air to ground attack on the Misratan Grads and howitzers in Tripoli is said by someone to have been a US made type 83 general purpose bomb. This type of bomb is ‘typically’ used together with a precision guidance package by the US Navy. It is not listed, as far as I know, amongst the armaments in use by the Algerian Air Force. The accuracy of the bombing clearly indicates a high level of aircrew training and that the target coordinates were given by observers on the ground. It would only be possible for well equipped air force to carry out a raid on Tripoli which might have involved in-flight refuelling. Carrier based aircraft could, of course, be brought into range.
No doubt more reliable information will emerge soon.
An AP report carried by the Huffington Post indicates that the attack was made at night and may have been carried out ‘to protect civilians’ and in response to a request made by Libya’s new House of Representatives.
Update 24th August 2014
A further strike early Saturday morning by ‘foreign’ warplanes on Misratan positions around Tripoli has been reported by the Libya Herald, Reuters, the British Sunday Telegraph and others.
‘Fajr Libya [The Misratans] on Saturday accused the United Arab Emirates and Egypt of involvement in the Friday night air raid and an earlier strike when two unidentified aircraft bombarded Islamist positions on Monday night.
“The Emirates and Egypt are involved in this cowardly aggression,” the coalition said in a statement read out to Libyan journalists in Tripoli.’
So far, Italy, Egypt and Algeria have denied armed intervention in Libya’s internecine battles.
CHAD. ‘Will Chad, a sometime client state of Muammar Gaddafi, find itself once again a target for al Qaeda?’ Update 3rd March 2013
Chad is one of a group of so called Sahel countries which include Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania having their northern Islamic provinces in the arid southern ‘shore’ of the Sahara. Their Christian and animist provinces lie in the richer, sub tropical regions. This split ethnicity and religiosity was manageable in French colonial times but is less so nowadays when the rise of militant Islamism threatens stability. Nigeria shares a similar problem stemming from the British colonial period.
In 2004 elements of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) entered Chad but were beaten off by Chadian forces. This group is now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and was ejected by French forces in January 2013 from Gao and Timbuktu in Mali. Where will AQIM go next?
The English Cuckoo lays its egg in the nest of another species of bird which then proceeds to hatch the egg and raise the chick. Al Qaeda seeks out failed states and settles on them like cuckoos, imposing strict sharia law and creating terror and misery. Waziristan, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Northern Nigeria and Mali are hosting substantial numbers of these ferocious extremists. Small but active al Qaeda franchises exist in the Philippines and Indonesia. There are those who argue that al Qaeda may have established a franchise in Benghazi and Derna in Eastern Libya.
As the French and the British direct their attention to the possible knock on effect of the crisis in Mali this post asks the question ‘will Chad, a sometime client state of Muammar Gaddafi, find itself once again a target for al Qaeda?’
The factors which attract al Qaeda seem to be a weak or remote central government, a weak national army, a weak and corrupt police force, intertribal strife, a safe haven in remote and rough terrain, access to criminal enterprises such as smuggling and capturing foreigners for ransom, poverty, neglect and native Salafist sympathisers.
The fall of a military dictatorship followed by political instability offers it a perfect nest in which to lay its parasitical egg. Will the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, survive in power now that Gaddafi has gone must now be a crucial question. The Tebesti Mountains of northern Chad and Sothern Libya may be particularly tempting for hardcore al Qaeda fighters seeking remote badlands in which to hide and thrive.
In 1960 Chad gained independence from France after sixty years of colonial rule. It is a vast, landlocked and ethnically diverse country in which the French failed to promote a sense of national unity. That is no surprise because there are a number of national cultures and religious affiliations, some of which have their roots in pre-colonial days. It follows that since independence Chad has suffered from deep religious and ethnic divisions. The struggle for power amongst the elites resulted in periods of armed rebellion and destructive civil war in which the meddlesome role of Gaddafi was notable.
In Chad there is the constant danger that the divide between the Arabised ‘Islamic’ north and the ‘Christian’ south will result in polarisation between the two, this inhibiting the formation of a democratic government and the sharing of resources. The government of Chad, which is formed from members of the northern and eastern Islamic groups, is becoming more Islamist in orientation. Chad, thus far, is a secular state, but the strengthening of Islam in public life and the friction between the faiths will threaten long term stability.
In Chad the use of armed force has been the means of establishing power. The current president, Idriss Déby, came to power by force of arms in 1990 and has since held on with the support of the national army which numbers around thirty thousand men. There is also Déby’s elite Republican Guard which is under his personal control and numbers around 5,500 personal. President Déby’s greatest external ally, France, maintains a military base there also. This last may be a lone guarantee of stability for Déby as things stand in the Sahel today.
AL Qaeda will have noted that the Tebesti region, bordering on Libya, is still an insecure area made the more unsafe by the large number of land mines laid by the Libyans when they occupied the Aozou Strip from 1973 to 1994. Chad has a unique position as it bridges sub Saharan and North Africa and also east and west Sahel. It also has long boarders with Sudan’s unstable and remote Darfur province and in the south with the troubled Central African Republic. Another hostage to fortune for Chad lurks in the north where its border with Libya lies somewhere within the Aozou Strip the ownership of which the two countries disputed violently between 1973 and 1994.
Muammar Gaddafi reigned in Libya for more that forty years during which he meddled too often in the affairs of his southern neighbour Chad. Gaddafi and President Idriss Déby of Chad were particularly close, a relationship with inevitable consequences for the future of the two countries. France has been Idriss Déby’s main source of external support during his twenty years reign but Libya was ally number two, financially and politically.
Libya has enough to do to establish a democratic government and recover from its recent civil war. The northern regions of Chad, previously totally dependent on trade with Libya, will take time to re-establish relations with a neighbour troubled by intertribal strife and lack of border control. Relations with Libya are made the more difficult because a large number of Chadians accused of being Gaddafi’s mercenaries remain incarcerated in jails maintained by Libya militias. There are persistent rumours that they are being tortured.
The instability which followed Gaddafi’s summary execution in his home town of Sirte on 29th October 2011 has affected the nations of the Sahel and catalysed the Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali followed by the disastrous rise of an al Qaeda franchise. This undesirable outcome threatened the stability of not only Mali but also neighbouring Niger, the source of yellow cake uranium which supplies French nuclear power stations. If the domino effect is valid Chad, France’s other ex-colonial ally in the Sahel, was in line for an al Qaeda takeover bid. France was, therefore, forced to intervene when the al Qaeda become overconfident and threatened the Mali government in Bamako.
The mobility of the al Qaeda leadership can be in no doubt. The bad lands of the deep Sahara have long been traversed by the Tuareg and the Tebu, people for whom the artificial borders resulting from old colonial acquisitions have little meaning. They are able to traverse great arid regions which they know as well London Taxi drivers their own perplexing city. They share this talent with a number of Bedouin tribes who have traded across the Sahara from time immemorial. Thus it is possible for the al Qaeda franchises and the smuggling and the criminal bands to vanish into inhospitable and inaccessible country only reappear elsewhere to cause trouble. Rebellion and criminality is thus likely to pop up at any place in this vast arena to destabilise fragile economies and make refugees of hordes of people.
The French may dread the possibility of a successful coup against the Déby regime precipitated by the fall of Gaddafi and the instability in the Sahel region. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb must anticipate the possibility with increasing confidence.
Update 2nd March 2013
Al Qaeda leader probably killed by Chadian forces
Update 3rd March 2013
More on the possible killing of an al Qaeda leader by Chadian forces:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/algeria/9905870/Mokhtar-Belmokhtars-death-could-have-repercussions-for-French-hostages.html
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